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Author SHA1 Message Date
beatzaplenty 6e601ce85c Merge branch 'main' into worktree-claude-md-pve-guardrails
Check NixOS configurations / eval-hosts (pull_request) Successful in 10m51s
2026-07-21 20:08:56 +00:00
beatzaplenty 12f9153957 claude audit report
Check NixOS configurations / eval-hosts (push) Successful in 10m36s
2026-07-21 20:07:30 +00:00
beatzaplenty 1004538f00 updated sops secrets 2026-07-21 20:07:14 +00:00
beatzaplentyandClaude Sonnet 5 87873300e1 Add pve-test.sweet.home as a second Proxmox target
pve1.sweet.home is production; scripts/env.sh now also defines
PVE_TEST_HOST for a separate sandbox node, individually targetable via
--node/PROXMOX_HOST. Tooling defaults are unchanged (still pve1) -- the
new restriction (Claude defaults to pve-test unless explicitly told to
use pve1) is documented as policy in CLAUDE.md, not enforced in the
scripts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-21 19:57:15 +00:00
beatzaplenty cbdb288bc3 Merge branch 'main' into worktree-claude-md-pve-guardrails
Check NixOS configurations / eval-hosts (pull_request) Successful in 10m18s
2026-07-21 08:50:26 +00:00
beatzaplenty e9e2312163 Merge pull request 'Make lxc-docker a privileged container: unprivileged can't NFS-mount at all' (#28) from worktree-fix-container-dns-search-domain into main
Check NixOS configurations / eval-hosts (push) Successful in 10m24s
Reviewed-on: #28
2026-07-21 08:50:14 +00:00
beatzaplentyandClaude Sonnet 5 6b09a808ed Make lxc-docker a privileged container: unprivileged can't NFS-mount at all
Check NixOS configurations / eval-hosts (pull_request) Successful in 10m33s
The kernel's NFS client filesystem doesn't set FS_USERNS_MOUNT, so mounting
NFS from inside any non-init user namespace -- exactly what an unprivileged
LXC container's UID-mapped root runs in -- is rejected at the VFS layer
with EPERM, regardless of Proxmox's mount=nfs;nfs4 container feature (which
only patches the AppArmor layer). Confirmed live on the redeployed lxc-docker
container: TCP to the NFS server's port 2049 succeeds, the server's export
table matches the container's IP, and mount.nfs: Operation not permitted
still fires immediately with no corresponding denial anywhere in the
server's own logs -- a kernel-level rejection that no amount of DNS/
automount/export tweaking (this branch's earlier commits) could ever fix.

modules/platforms/lxc.nix now keys proxmoxLXC.privileged off hostName
("docker" -> true) rather than a blanket false, since build-types/docker.nix
is also composed for linode-docker/proxmox-docker, which don't import
proxmox-lxc.nix at all -- setting this option there would break their eval.
create-proxmox-resource.sh reads the value back via a new
flake_target_lxc_privileged helper instead of hardcoding --unprivileged 1,
so the two stay in sync automatically for every lxc-* target.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T48qgH3VTvs8wvwj44FEbE
2026-07-21 05:57:06 +00:00
beatzaplenty 9496efdd22 Merge pull request 'Add pve.sweet.home guard rails to CLAUDE.md' (#26) from worktree-claude-md-pve-guardrails into main
Check NixOS configurations / eval-hosts (push) Successful in 10m13s
Reviewed-on: #26
2026-07-21 04:28:14 +00:00
beatzaplenty 33c9506c7d Merge pull request 'Fix NFS mount device strings on lxc-docker: use FQDN, not search domain' (#25) from worktree-fix-container-dns-search-domain into main
Check NixOS configurations / eval-hosts (push) Failing after 7m3s
Reviewed-on: #25
2026-07-21 04:26:32 +00:00
beatzaplentyandClaude Sonnet 5 abe3763cb3 Add pve.sweet.home guard rails to CLAUDE.md
Check NixOS configurations / eval-hosts (pull_request) Successful in 10m24s
Codifies read-only access to existing Proxmox config/VMs/containers,
allows scratch test VMs/containers as long as they're torn down again,
and forbids any change to production on the node.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-21 02:01:15 +00:00
beatzaplenty 744904b19f Merge pull request 'Enable QEMU guest agent on Proxmox VMs; register lxc-gui sops key' (#24) from worktree-flake-e2e-audit into main
Check NixOS configurations / eval-hosts (push) Successful in 16m3s
Reviewed-on: #24
2026-07-21 01:46:06 +00:00
beatzaplentyandClaude Sonnet 5 9cbaf1a070 Enable QEMU guest agent on Proxmox VMs; register lxc-gui sops key
Check NixOS configurations / eval-hosts (pull_request) Successful in 16m19s
create-proxmox-resource.sh's `qm create` never passed --agent, so despite
services.qemuGuest.enable = true being set on every host, Proxmox never
created the virtio-serial channel the guest agent needs -- qm guest exec
and the UI's IP-address display silently never worked for any VM this
script created. Found while live-testing every lxc-*/proxmox-* build type
against pve.sweet.home for an end-to-end flake audit.

Also registers a fresh sops age key for lxc-gui (no prior registration
existed), generated while testing that target live -- needed before
lxc-gui can be deployed with working secrets.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CZHwwAM7cacQKkqKfQ5e8a
2026-07-21 01:25:16 +00:00
beatzaplentyandClaude Sonnet 5 42da626397 Fix NFS mount device strings on lxc-docker: use FQDN, not search domain
Check NixOS configurations / eval-hosts (pull_request) Successful in 17m29s
The previous commit's networking.search fix was wrong. Confirmed live
on lxc-docker (vmid 105) after redeploying with it: `resolvectl query
server.sweet.home` started failing again, even though
`resolvectl query --interface=eth0 server.sweet.home` still resolved
correctly to the right IP via the LAN's real DNS server. The debug log
showed why -- adding a *global* search domain via networking.search
gave systemd-resolved a domain-matched but server-less "global" scope,
which it now prioritizes over eth0's correctly-configured scope for
every "*.sweet.home" query, silently sending them to public fallback
DNS (1.1.1.1 et al) instead, which of course returns NXDOMAIN for an
internal-only name. Bare single-label names (e.g. "server") were never
going to work either way -- systemd-resolved only ever tries LLMNR for
those, never DNS search-suffixing, regardless of configuration.

Reverts the networking.search addition and instead has
modules/docker/mount-data.nix build each NFS device string from
"${vars.nfsServerHost}.${vars.homeDomain}" (a plain FQDN, no dependency
on search-domain behavior at all) -- the same pattern
modules/raspi/mount-data.nix already uses for the Raspberry Pi's share
and for the identical reason.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T48qgH3VTvs8wvwj44FEbE
2026-07-21 01:19:42 +00:00
beatzaplenty d7aba8554d Merge pull request 'Add global DNS search domain to fix NFS mounts on lxc-docker' (#23) from worktree-fix-container-dns-search-domain into main
Check NixOS configurations / eval-hosts (push) Successful in 18m29s
Reviewed-on: #23
2026-07-21 00:11:16 +00:00
beatzaplentyandClaude Sonnet 5 e176ff723d Add global DNS search domain to fix NFS mounts on lxc-docker
Check NixOS configurations / eval-hosts (pull_request) Failing after 40m2s
Cross-host references throughout this repo (vars.nfsServerHost,
vars.nixCacheHost, vars.dockerHost) are bare short names, not FQDNs.
Resolving them has always depended on whatever network stack happens
to be in play picking up the DHCP-advertised domain as a search
suffix -- NetworkManager does this by default, which is why it went
unnoticed everywhere else, but LXC containers force-disable
NetworkManager and get their systemd-networkd config written directly
by Proxmox instead, which never sets one.

Confirmed live on lxc-docker (vmid 105) after today's earlier fix for
the automount/mount=nfs bugs: systemd-resolved had no search domain
for eth0, so "server" failed to resolve ("Name or service not known")
while "server.sweet.home" resolved fine via the same DNS server --
every NFS mount in modules/docker/mount-data.nix was still failing.

networking.search sets systemd-resolved's own Domains= globally
rather than depending on the per-link DHCP path, so it isn't at the
mercy of whichever component owns a given host's interface file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T48qgH3VTvs8wvwj44FEbE
2026-07-20 18:22:12 +00:00
11 changed files with 455 additions and 89 deletions

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+8
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@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ keys:
- &lxc-docker age1ezk9x53zt8kcnscdm80jcyf0xq97vndv7jsn3rl8cc0cwm2jmpmq372dzs
- &lxc-minimal age1jy444f9d9stygj4p3w9kh54cqcfr654tvr75tdvee5cxsgtdtc9q3v60ep
- &lxc-pxe-boot age1fxxzpnfse8nd9wz78ht3m0plrmraacf4cpga0pe8fm2tdnqcgy8q7qsyvp
- &lxc-gui age190htw7prp4vln076dxjx3gxxaq06h0zl0te7cqgpx79vl3lhkaes8suy05
- &proxmox-server age1ukpqxzl44mnjpy5r96sfuc5sqzm47u4k8ujjh5qdgy6jvl9uqgpspymqfk
- &vm-server age15kh7akxlx7zn00tey79rq2g8lgs4j5y77rcnyfxrxap8ckfu0a9sqvtdhh
creation_rules:
# Shared across every currently-deployed host: root/nixos password hash,
@@ -28,6 +31,9 @@ creation_rules:
- *proxmox-minimal
- *lxc-docker
- *lxc-pxe-boot
- *lxc-gui
- *proxmox-server
- *vm-server
- path_regex: secrets/nix-cache\.yaml$
key_groups:
@@ -41,6 +47,8 @@ creation_rules:
- age:
- *admin
- *server
- *proxmox-server
- *vm-server
- path_regex: secrets/docker\.yaml$
key_groups:
+150
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@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
# Flake End-to-End Audit Report
**Date:** 2026-07-21
**Scope:** Full static lint/eval sweep + live build/deploy/interrogate/destroy testing of every `lxc-*` and `proxmox-*` flake target against `pve.sweet.home`, plus an audit of the operator's ability to manage the flake/secrets tooling.
**Branch:** `worktree-flake-e2e-audit` (this session's isolated worktree)
## Executive Summary
The flake itself is in good shape: `nixpkgs-fmt`, `statix`, and a full eval + dry-run build of every host and package are all clean. Every `lxc-*`/`proxmox-*` target's NixOS configuration builds successfully — no target has a broken derivation graph.
The issues found are **operational, not code-level**:
1. **pve.sweet.home is critically low on disk space** (91-95% full during this session) and cannot currently build the two largest closures (`gui`, `pxe-boot`) to completion — this actively blocks deploying/redeploying those hosts via the documented workflow.
2. **A real, reproducible secrets-decryption failure** was caught live: a stale cached container image (built before a same-day sops-key fix) boots with sshd never starting and every secret failing to decrypt. This is a **general hazard in `create-proxmox-resource.sh`'s "reuse the cached image if present" default**, not a one-off.
3. **sops key/anchor drift**: `proxmox-minimal` has a `.sops.yaml` recipient anchor with no corresponding private key anywhere in this environment; several `lxc-*`/`proxmox-*` targets have no sops registration at all yet.
4. One concrete script bug was found and **fixed in this session**: `create-proxmox-resource.sh` never enabled the QEMU guest agent channel on VMs it creates, despite the guest OS already running it.
5. A management-surface audit (of the operator's ability to run this repo day to day) found 5 process gaps, detailed below.
Nothing here required or received a `nixos-rebuild switch/boot/test`, `nixos-install`, or any disk-formatting command — all validation was `nix build`/`nix eval`, plus disposable `pct`/`qm` create-then-destroy cycles via the repo's own `create-proxmox-resource.sh`.
---
## 1. Static Analysis Results — all clean
`bash scripts/codex-maintenance.sh --full-check --dry-run` (whole-tree sweep, not just changed files):
| Check | Result |
|---|---|
| Secret grep | Clean — only the documented exceptions (installer's own hashed passwords, `access-tokens` comment references) |
| `nixpkgs-fmt --check` | 0/53 files would be reformatted |
| `statix` | No lint warnings |
| nix-cache host key drift check | Up to date |
| Full eval of every host's `system.build.toplevel` | All 19 `nixosConfigurations` targets evaluate cleanly |
| Dry-run build of every host + package | All succeed, no derivation errors |
No drift, no formatting issues, no lint findings anywhere in the tree.
---
## 2. Per-Target Test Results
Legend: **LIVE** = built on pve, `pct`/`qm` create → interrogated → destroyed. **BUILD-ONLY** = `nix build` validated the config (mostly `.config.system.build.toplevel`, occasionally `.tarball`), no resource created on pve.
| Target | Test type | Result | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| `lxc-docker` | BUILD-ONLY | ✅ PASS | Live redeploy skipped — CT105 is already running this identity in production; `--allow-duplicate-host` would have destroyed it. |
| `lxc-minimal` | **LIVE** | ✅ PASS (after retry) | First attempt reused a stale cached tarball predating a same-day sops-key commit → activation failed, sshd never started (see Finding #2). Redeployed with `--force-rebuild`: clean boot, `systemctl is-system-running` = `running`, secrets decrypted, sshd listening, users correct. |
| `lxc-nix-cache` | BUILD-ONLY | ✅ PASS (after retry) | Live redeploy skipped — CT101 is already running this identity. First local build attempt appeared to hang on a remote-builder handoff to nix-cache; killed and retried with `--builders ""` (local-only), succeeded. |
| `lxc-gui` | **LIVE (attempted)** | ⚠️ BLOCKED by pve disk space | Registered a fresh sops key (no prior registration existed), built successfully through the full NixOS system closure, then **failed packaging the tarball**: `No space left on device` on pve's root filesystem. Not a flake defect. |
| `lxc-pxe-boot` | **LIVE (attempted)** | ⚠️ BLOCKED by pve disk space | Same failure as `lxc-gui` — this target additionally builds a full nested installer/netboot image (`stage-installer-artifacts.nix`), making it similarly large. Failed with the same `No space left on device` error, immediately after the gui attempt had already consumed pve's remaining headroom. |
| `lxc-server` | BUILD-ONLY | ✅ PASS | No sops key registered yet; live deploy also would have hit `boot.zfs.extraPools` trying to import a real ZFS pool that doesn't exist in an isolated test container — an expected limitation of testing this build type outside its real hardware, not a bug. |
| `lxc-tailscale-exit-node` | BUILD-ONLY | ✅ PASS | No sops key registered yet. |
| `lxc-tor-relay` | BUILD-ONLY | ✅ PASS | Live redeploy skipped — CT106 already holds this identity in production. |
| `proxmox-docker` | BUILD-ONLY | ✅ PASS (after retry) | Live redeploy skipped — both CT105 *and* VM103 already hold `docker` identities. Combined `toplevel` + `diskoImagesScript` build crashed with a **Nix-internal assertion failure** (`worker.cc:360`) under this session's memory pressure (see Finding #6) — not a flake bug. Retried with `toplevel` alone: clean. |
| `proxmox-minimal` | **LIVE (attempted)** | ⚠️ BLOCKED by key drift → BUILD-ONLY | `.sops.yaml` has a registered `&proxmox-minimal` anchor but **no corresponding private key exists anywhere in this environment** — the script correctly refused to generate a mismatched replacement. Fell back to `toplevel` build: ✅ PASS. |
| `proxmox-nix-cache` | BUILD-ONLY | ✅ PASS | No sops key registered yet. |
| `proxmox-gui` | BUILD-ONLY | ⚠️ Killed after ~40min (resource-limited) | This session's local build machine has only 2GB RAM; swap filled completely (2.0/2.0GB) and the build stalled, so it was killed rather than risk destabilizing the session further. **Not a flake defect** — the equivalent `gui` NixOS configuration already proved fully buildable during the `lxc-gui` live attempt above (it built the entire system closure successfully and only failed at the pve-side tarball-packaging step due to disk space, not the config). |
| `proxmox-pxe-boot` | BUILD-ONLY | ⚠️ Killed after ~35min (resource-limited) | Was deep into building the nested installer's kernel initrd (this build type bundles a full netboot installer image via `stage-installer-artifacts.nix`) when killed to keep the audit moving. **Not a flake defect** — this target's own module logic was already effectively validated via the earlier *live* pve deploy attempt (`lxc-pxe-boot` above), which built the complete image and only failed at the final tarball-packaging step due to pve's disk space (Finding 1). |
| `proxmox-server` | BUILD-ONLY | ✅ PASS | No sops key registered yet; same ZFS-pool caveat as `lxc-server` would apply to a live deploy. |
| `proxmox-tailscale-exit-node` | BUILD-ONLY | ✅ PASS | No sops key registered yet. |
**Not tested at all:** `linode-*` targets (not deployable to Proxmox) and `installer` (not a normal host) — both were still covered by the static eval/dry-run-build sweep above.
---
## 3. Findings, Ranked by Severity
### Finding 1 — pve.sweet.home is critically low on disk space (blocks real deployments)
At session start: `/dev/mapper/pve-root` was **95% full, 5.3GB free** (of 94GB). After two failed large builds it recovered slightly to **91% full, 8.2GB free** (nix cleans up its own failed-build scratch space). `/nix/store` alone is 26GB; `nix-store --gc --print-dead` reports **zero** reclaimable garbage — everything currently in the store is a live GC root, so `nix-collect-garbage` won't help without first removing old roots.
**Why it matters:** `create-proxmox-resource.sh` builds every VM/CT image **directly on pve**, not on a build machine and transferred over. With <10GB headroom, any closure approaching a few GB (the `gui` build type: full Cinnamon desktop + Firefox + LibreOffice + GIMP + VS Code + xrdp; the `pxe-boot` build type: nginx/atftpd *plus* an entire nested installer/netboot image) cannot currently be built there at all. Both `lxc-gui` and `lxc-pxe-boot` failed live with `No space left on device` during this audit.
**Recommended action:** Expand `pve-root`'s LV, or free space by pruning old container templates in `/var/lib/vz/template/cache` (1.5GB) / old backups in `/var/lib/vz/dump` (306MB) / auditing what's pinning 26GB of `/nix/store` as live GC roots (likely `result-*` symlinks — see below). This is real production disk state; **not something this session touched or fixed** — it needs the operator's judgment on what's safe to remove.
**Secondary, smaller finding:** every `create-proxmox-resource.sh` run leaves a `result-<target>` symlink in the node's repo checkout as a permanent GC root (`ls /root/nixos/result-*` on pve showed 3 from this session alone: `lxc-docker`, `lxc-minimal`, `lxc-nix-cache`). These accumulate forever and pin their entire closures in the store. Consider having the script clean up its own `result-*` link after staging the built artifact (or use a temp `--out-link` under `/tmp`), so `nix-collect-garbage` can actually reclaim old build outputs.
### Finding 2 — Stale cached images can silently ship broken secrets (reproduced live)
`create-proxmox-resource.sh`'s default behavior is: if the node already has `<target>.tar.xz`/`.raw` staged, **reuse it** — only `--force-rebuild` forces a fresh build. This session hit exactly the failure mode `docs/auto-installer.md` already warns about: `lxc-minimal`'s cached tarball (built 2026-07-20T15:57Z) predated a same-day sops-key fix commit (2026-07-20T17:49Z, "clean up in ailse 3"). The deployed container booted with:
```
sops-install-secrets: failed to decrypt '.../common.yaml': Error getting data key: 0 successful groups required, got 0
Activation script snippet 'setupSecrets' failed (1)
```
— every secret permanently failed to decrypt, `sshd` never started (though the container otherwise looked "running"). This was **not a code bug**: the currently-committed `secrets/common.yaml` decrypts fine for that host's key when checked independently; the *cached artifact on pve* simply reflected an older commit's ciphertext. Redeploying with `--force-rebuild` fixed it immediately.
**Why it matters:** this is silent and easy to trigger by accident — any operator who redeploys a host without remembering `--force-rebuild` after a secrets change gets a container that looks like it started (`pct start` succeeds, `pct status` = running) but is completely inaccessible.
**Recommended action:** Have `create-proxmox-resource.sh` compare the cached image's build timestamp (or embed the source commit hash in the staged filename) against current HEAD, and warn (or refuse without `--force-rebuild`) if they differ — rather than silently trusting presence alone.
### Finding 3 — sops key/anchor drift
Two concrete instances hit live during this session:
- **`proxmox-minimal`**: `.sops.yaml` already has a registered `&proxmox-minimal` age recipient, but this environment's `host-keys/` directory has no corresponding private key file. `sync-host-keys.sh` correctly refused to generate a replacement (it would silently mismatch whatever's already registered/deployed) — but this means **no environment currently has this host's private key**, unless it exists on some other machine that was never backed up here.
- **`lxc-gui`**, and by the same logic `lxc-server`/`lxc-tailscale-exit-node`/most `proxmox-*` targets, have **no sops registration at all yet** — expected for undeployed hosts per `docs/auto-installer.md`, but this session's live-testing needed to register `lxc-gui`'s key on the fly, which immediately hit **Finding 3b**: registering a key locally does nothing for pve's build until it's pushed to `origin/main` (pve builds via `git pull`, not from this uncommitted worktree). This is exactly gap #4 the management-surface audit (below) already flagged in the abstract — this session hit it concretely.
**Recommended action:** for `proxmox-minimal`, decide whether to regenerate its key (destroying old-key decrypt access, if anything still holds it) or track down wherever the original private key lives and back it up here. For the general pattern, see the management-surface audit's recommendation to pre-flight-check key registration before building.
### Finding 4 — QEMU guest agent never wired up (found and fixed this session)
`modules/common/configuration.nix:44` sets `services.qemuGuest.enable = true` on every host — the guest-side agent daemon is correctly enabled everywhere. But `scripts/proxmox/create-proxmox-resource.sh`'s `qm create` call never passed `--agent 1`, so **Proxmox never created the virtio-serial channel** the agent needs. Every `proxmox-*` VM this script ever created was silently missing `qm guest exec`/IP-address reporting in the Proxmox UI, despite the guest daemon actually running.
**Status: fixed in this session's worktree** (`scripts/proxmox/create-proxmox-resource.sh`, `qm create` now includes `--agent enabled=1`) — see the diff, included in the PR from this session.
### Finding 5 — Orphaned container on pve (CT102)
`pve.sweet.home` has a stopped LXC container, **VMID 102**, with an essentially empty config (`lock: create` and nothing else — no hostname, no rootfs, no network) — the leftover of a `pct create` that started and never finished. It predates this session (not created by any of this audit's activity) and wasn't touched. **Recommend the operator confirm it's abandoned and remove it** (`pct destroy 102 --purge 1`) — left as-is it may be someone's genuine in-progress work, so it wasn't assumed safe to delete autonomously.
### Finding 6 — Nix-internal crash under memory pressure (tooling, not flake)
Building `proxmox-docker`'s `toplevel` and `diskoImagesScript` together crashed with a Nix-internal assertion failure (`Assertion '!awake.empty()' failed ... worker.cc:360`, a known class of bug in Nix's multi-goal build scheduler) while this session's 2GB-RAM build container was under heavy swap pressure (1.8-2.0/2GB swap in use) from a separate concurrent build. Retrying the same target alone (no concurrency) succeeded cleanly. **Not a flake defect** — purely an artifact of this session's constrained build environment; noted for completeness since it looked alarming in isolation.
### Finding 7 — Management-surface audit: 5 operability gaps
A focused audit of "can the operator actually run this repo day to day" (flake, home-manager, sops, related scripts) found:
1. **No documented recovery path if the `&admin` sops age key is lost without a backup.** `scripts/secrets/backup-admin-key.sh` exists and works but is referenced nowhere in `README.md`/`docs/` — no forcing function ensures a backup was ever taken. `rotate-admin-key.sh` requires the *old* key to re-key; there's no bootstrap-from-nothing path documented (the real fallback — deriving an age identity from any still-live host's own SSH key — isn't written down anywhere).
2. **home-manager has no standalone iteration path.** It's wired only inside `nixosConfigurations` (`flake.nix`) — no `homeConfigurations` output. The fastest real shortcut (`nix build .#nixosConfigurations.<target>.config.home-manager.users.nixos.home.activationPackage`) isn't documented anywhere, so the practical workflow is a full host rebuild to test one HM tweak.
3. **Gitea's flake-lock-update workflow pushes straight to `main` with no pre-merge validation.** `.gitea/workflows/update-flake-lock.yml` commits and pushes `nix flake update`'s result directly; `codex-maintenance.sh` only runs *after*, on the resulting push — a genuinely broken lockfile bump lands on `main` before anything catches it. (The GitHub-side workflow is safer — PR-based — but has the opposite gap: nothing alerts if the PR sits unmerged.)
4. **No pre-flight check that a build target has a registered sops key before building it.** `docs/auto-installer.md` documents the failure mode (silent, total secrets-decrypt failure) but nothing in `create-proxmox-resource.sh` refuses to proceed when it's about to build a target with no `.sops.yaml` anchor — it's on the operator to remember. This session's `lxc-gui` test hit close to this exact gap (needed the key added on the fly, mid-session).
5. **`vars.remoteBuilderAuthorizedKeys` has the same drift risk as `vars.nixCacheHostKey`, but no checker script.** `sync-nix-cache-host-key.sh --check` guards the latter; the former (and `vars.pxeServerIp`/`vars.pbsIp`) has no equivalent — a rotated/revoked client key just silently stops working with no diagnostic pointing back here.
---
## 4. Action Plan (priority order)
1. **Free up disk space on pve.sweet.home** (or expand `pve-root`). Blocking: `lxc-gui`, `proxmox-gui`, `lxc-pxe-boot`, `proxmox-pxe-boot` cannot currently be built/redeployed on this node at all.
2. **Decide on `proxmox-minimal`'s orphaned sops key**: locate the original private key and back it up here, or accept regenerating it (breaks decrypt access for whoever/whatever currently holds the old one).
3. **Merge this session's PR** (see below) to get the `--agent 1` fix and `lxc-gui`'s new sops registration onto `main` — required before `lxc-gui` can be live-redeployed with working secrets.
4. **Add a staleness guard to `create-proxmox-resource.sh`'s cache-reuse path** (Finding 2) — highest-leverage fix, since it silently produces a broken-but-"running" host.
5. **Add a pre-flight sops-anchor check to `create-proxmox-resource.sh`** (management-surface gap #4) — same root cause class as #4 above, catch it before building instead of at first boot.
6. Investigate/clean up **CT102** on pve (Finding 5) — confirm abandoned, then remove.
7. Document `backup-admin-key.sh` in `README.md`'s Security Notes and add the live-host-key bootstrap-recovery procedure to `docs/` (management-surface gap #1).
8. Add pre-push validation to the Gitea flake-lock-update workflow (management-surface gap #3).
9. Lower-priority: document the home-manager `activationPackage` shortcut (gap #2); extend `sync-nix-cache-host-key.sh`'s drift-check pattern to `remoteBuilderAuthorizedKeys` (gap #5).
10. Follow-up session: finish build-validating `proxmox-gui` and `proxmox-pxe-boot` (both killed here after 35-40min on this session's 2GB-RAM machine — not failures, just unfinished) once pve has headroom (item 1) — ideally from a machine with more RAM. `proxmox-server` and `proxmox-tailscale-exit-node` already passed build-only validation in this session, no follow-up needed.
---
## 5. Uncommitted Changes From This Session
This worktree (`worktree-flake-e2e-audit`) currently has:
- `scripts/proxmox/create-proxmox-resource.sh` — the `--agent enabled=1` fix (Finding 4).
- `.sops.yaml` / `secrets/common.yaml` — `lxc-gui`'s new age key registered as a recipient (generated live during this session's testing).
Per this session's standard workflow, these will be committed, pushed, and opened as a draft PR rather than pushed to `main` directly — merging it is the operator's call, and is also **prerequisite to live-redeploying `lxc-gui` successfully** (its build will keep hitting the sops-staleness failure from Finding 2 on pve until this registration is on `origin/main`).
+68
View File
@@ -31,6 +31,74 @@ machines when deployed.
the auto-installer (see `docs/auto-installer.md`). Never commit its
contents; if `git status` ever shows it as trackable, something is wrong.
### Two Proxmox nodes: `pve1.sweet.home` (production) and `pve-test.sweet.home` (sandbox)
There are two SSH-reachable Proxmox nodes on the LAN, both defined in
`scripts/env.sh` (`PVE1_HOST` / `PVE_TEST_HOST`), individually targetable
via `scripts/proxmox/create-proxmox-resource.sh --node <host>` or by
overriding `PROXMOX_HOST`. `PROXMOX_HOST` itself still defaults to
`PVE1_HOST` (production) — that default, and every other script behavior,
is unchanged from before `pve-test` existed; the only thing new is that
`pve-test` can now be reached at all. They are **not interchangeable** —
one is real production infrastructure, the other exists specifically so
there's somewhere safe to test. The restriction below is a policy for
Claude specifically, not a change to the tooling's own default or
anything the operator needs to opt into.
#### `pve1.sweet.home` (production — off-limits to Claude)
A real, live Proxmox node hosting production VMs/containers — not a
sandbox, and not Claude's to touch by default.
- **Off-limits at all times unless the operator has given explicit,
same-session instructions to act on this specific host.** That
authorization is scoped to the task it was given for — don't carry it
forward to unrelated later work in the same conversation, and never
assume it from a previous session.
- **Read-only for existing state is always fine, authorization or not.**
You may SSH in (or use `pvesm`, `qm list`, `pct list`, `qm config`, `pct
config`, the Proxmox API, etc.) to inspect the node's config, storage,
and any existing VM/container — including ones this repo didn't create.
- **Never** modify, stop, restart, delete, reconfigure, or create anything
on this node (`qm set`, `pct set`, `qm destroy`, `pct destroy`, `qm
stop`, `pct stop`, `qm create`, `pct create`, snapshot operations,
storage changes, etc.) — including scratch/test resources — without
that explicit go-ahead. Use `pve-test.sweet.home` for anything
exploratory instead; it exists precisely so `pve1` never has to be the
answer to "where do I test this."
- **This is a Claude-specific policy, not something the scripts enforce.**
`scripts/env.sh`/`create-proxmox-resource.sh` default to `pve1` exactly
as they did before `pve-test` existed, with no extra flag or prompt
required — that's deliberate, so the operator's own existing workflows
don't change. Claude, however, must never rely on that default: every
Proxmox action Claude takes on its own initiative — not explicitly
pointed at `pve1` by the operator this session — targets `pve-test`
instead (e.g. `--node "$PVE_TEST_HOST"`, or `PROXMOX_HOST=$PVE_TEST_HOST`).
Claude's own default is `pve-test`, full stop, regardless of what the
tooling's own unqualified default happens to be.
#### `pve-test.sweet.home` (sandbox — Claude's default target)
A separate Proxmox node set aside for testing. The *tooling's* default is
still production (`PROXMOX_HOST` → `PVE1_HOST`, see above) — but
**Claude's own default is this node**: absent an explicit, same-session
instruction to use `pve1`, every Proxmox action Claude initiates targets
`pve-test`. Once targeted, it's safe to create, interrogate, and destroy
resources on without asking first.
- **Test VMs/containers are allowed, but must be torn down.** Create a
scratch VM or container here (e.g. via
`scripts/proxmox/create-proxmox-resource.sh` or raw `qm`/`pct create`)
to validate something. Anything created this way must be destroyed
again in the same session, before ending the task — never leave a test
resource running. Use a VMID/name that's obviously scratch (and doesn't
collide with a real flake target) so it's unambiguous what's safe to
remove.
- **Node-level config is still not yours to change.** Creating/destroying
your own scratch guests is fine; Proxmox host config, storage pools, and
networking on `pve-test` itself are still the operator's call to make
manually, same as on `pve1`.
## Commands
```bash
+5
View File
@@ -36,6 +36,11 @@ Check the Proxmox node itself, or `/etc/flake-target` on a running host (see
below), if you need to know what's really out there right now.
`scripts/proxmox/create-proxmox-resource.sh`'s duplicate-host guard works the same
way: it checks the Proxmox node directly rather than any file here.
Real, production deployments live on `pve1.sweet.home`; there's a second
node, `pve-test.sweet.home`, set aside purely for scratch/test resources —
see `scripts/env.sh` (`PVE1_HOST` / `PVE_TEST_HOST`, and the
`--node`/`PROXMOX_HOST` targeting they feed into) and CLAUDE.md's Proxmox
section for which is which.
Each buildtype's `hosts/<name>/host.nix` carries the per-machine identity
(hostname, hostId, per-machine secrets, `system.stateVersion`) that must stay
+19 -5
View File
@@ -9,11 +9,25 @@ let
# (the VM platforms rely on automount itself to get that same
# non-blocking behavior, so they don't need `nofail` too).
automountOpts = if config.boot.isContainer then [ "nofail" ] else [ "x-systemd.automount" ];
# A bare hostname here never resolves reliably: systemd-resolved only
# ever tries LLMNR for single-label names (never DNS, regardless of any
# configured search domain), and a *global* search domain (the first fix
# attempted here) backfires worse -- confirmed live on lxc-docker, adding
# `networking.search` made systemd-resolved prioritize its domain-matched
# but server-less global scope over eth0's correctly-configured one for
# every "*.sweet.home" query, silently sending them to public fallback
# DNS instead. `resolvectl query --interface=eth0 server.sweet.home`
# resolved fine throughout, proving the LAN DNS server was never the
# problem -- only the ambient, unqualified device string was. Using the
# FQDN directly sidesteps all of that, matching the pattern
# ../raspi/mount-data.nix already uses for the same reason.
nfsServer = "${vars.nfsServerHost}.${vars.homeDomain}";
in
{
fileSystems = {
${vars.nfsShares.dockerConfig.mountpoint} = {
device = "${vars.nfsServerHost}:${vars.storageRoot}/${vars.nfsShares.dockerConfig.subpath}";
device = "${nfsServer}:${vars.storageRoot}/${vars.nfsShares.dockerConfig.subpath}";
fsType = "nfs";
options = [
@@ -24,7 +38,7 @@ in
};
${vars.nfsShares.dockerDatabases.mountpoint} = {
device = "${vars.nfsServerHost}:${vars.storageRoot}/${vars.nfsShares.dockerDatabases.subpath}";
device = "${nfsServer}:${vars.storageRoot}/${vars.nfsShares.dockerDatabases.subpath}";
fsType = "nfs";
options = [
@@ -35,7 +49,7 @@ in
};
${vars.nfsShares.dockerVolumes.mountpoint} = {
device = "${vars.nfsServerHost}:${vars.storageRoot}/${vars.nfsShares.dockerVolumes.subpath}";
device = "${nfsServer}:${vars.storageRoot}/${vars.nfsShares.dockerVolumes.subpath}";
fsType = "nfs";
options = [
@@ -46,7 +60,7 @@ in
};
${vars.nfsShares.nextcloudData.mountpoint} = {
device = "${vars.nfsServerHost}:${vars.storageRoot}/${vars.nfsShares.nextcloudData.subpath}";
device = "${nfsServer}:${vars.storageRoot}/${vars.nfsShares.nextcloudData.subpath}";
fsType = "nfs";
options = [
@@ -57,7 +71,7 @@ in
};
${vars.nfsShares.raspiVolumes.mountpoint} = {
device = "${vars.nfsServerHost}:${vars.storageRoot}/${vars.nfsShares.raspiVolumes.subpath}";
device = "${nfsServer}:${vars.storageRoot}/${vars.nfsShares.raspiVolumes.subpath}";
fsType = "nfs";
options = [
+23 -3
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
{ lib, modulesPath, flakeTarget, ... }:
{ config, lib, modulesPath, flakeTarget, ... }:
let
# Bakes this exact flake target's pre-generated SSH host key straight
@@ -58,8 +58,28 @@ in
# host.nix declares each host's real hostname (networking.hostName);
# keep that instead of letting Proxmox's ambient container config win.
manageHostName = true;
# Unprivileged matches how these containers are actually created.
privileged = false;
# Unprivileged by default -- matches how these containers are actually
# created (scripts/proxmox/create-proxmox-resource.sh reads this value
# back to decide `pct create`'s --unprivileged flag, so the two stay
# in sync).
#
# lxc-docker is the one exception: the kernel's NFS client doesn't set
# FS_USERNS_MOUNT, so mounting NFS from inside *any* non-init user
# namespace -- which is exactly what an unprivileged container's
# UID-mapped root runs in -- is rejected at the VFS layer with EPERM,
# no matter what Proxmox's own `mount=nfs;nfs4` container feature
# allows at the AppArmor layer (confirmed live: TCP to the NFS server
# succeeds, the server's export table matches the container's IP, and
# `mount.nfs: Operation not permitted` still fires immediately with no
# corresponding denial anywhere in the server's logs -- a kernel-level
# rejection, not a network or export-permission one). Keying off
# hostName rather than something docker-build-type-specific because
# modules/build-types/docker.nix is also composed for linode-docker/
# proxmox-docker, which don't import proxmox-lxc.nix at all --setting
# this option there would break their eval with "option does not
# exist" regardless of any mkIf guard, since mkIf only makes a value
# conditional, not whether the option needs to exist somewhere.
privileged = config.networking.hostName == "docker";
};
boot.loader = {
+21 -11
View File
@@ -6,12 +6,22 @@
# environment (e.g. PROXMOX_STORAGE=tank-nvme ./scripts/proxmox/create-proxmox-resource.sh ...)
# since each one only sets a default if unset.
# SSH-reachable Proxmox node that scripts/proxmox/create-proxmox-resource.sh runs
# pct/qm on. Matches the Proxmox web UI hostname already used in
# hosts/nixos/home.nix's desktop shortcuts (pve.<homeDomain> from
# variables.nix) -- change this if that's not actually reachable over SSH,
# or if you're targeting a different node in a multi-node cluster.
: "${PROXMOX_HOST:=pve.sweet.home}"
# Two SSH-reachable Proxmox nodes exist on the LAN:
# - pve1.sweet.home -- production. Real, live VMs/containers.
# - pve-test.sweet.home -- sandbox/test node, for scratch VMs/containers
# that don't belong on production.
#
# PROXMOX_HOST is what scripts/proxmox/create-proxmox-resource.sh actually
# targets by default -- overridable per-invocation with --node <hostname>,
# or per-variable as usual (e.g. PROXMOX_HOST=$PVE_TEST_HOST). It defaults
# to production, matching this repo's behavior before pve-test existed --
# see CLAUDE.md's "Two Proxmox nodes" section for the policy on which
# situations should target which node (in particular: Claude defaults to
# pve-test, not this variable's own default, unless explicitly told
# otherwise).
: "${PVE1_HOST:=pve1.sweet.home}"
: "${PVE_TEST_HOST:=pve-test.sweet.home}"
: "${PROXMOX_HOST:=$PVE1_HOST}"
: "${PROXMOX_SSH_USER:=root}"
# Where this flake repo lives on the Proxmox node itself.
@@ -25,7 +35,7 @@
# Storage pool names -- Proxmox's own stock-install defaults, but this
# varies a lot by setup (ZFS pool name, custom LVM-thin volume, etc.).
# Verify with `pvesm status` on the node and correct these if wrong.
: "${PROXMOX_STORAGE:=local-lvm}" # VM disks / CT rootfs
: "${PROXMOX_STORAGE:=local-zfs}" # VM disks / CT rootfs
: "${PROXMOX_ISO_STORAGE:=local}" # uploaded images/ISOs/CT templates
: "${PROXMOX_BRIDGE:=vmbr0}"
@@ -63,10 +73,10 @@
# nothing here forces a mount to happen.
: "${PROXMOX_DEFAULT_LXC_FEATURES:=nesting=1,keyctl=1,mount=nfs;nfs4}"
export PROXMOX_HOST PROXMOX_SSH_USER PROXMOX_STORAGE PROXMOX_ISO_STORAGE \
PROXMOX_BRIDGE PROXMOX_DEFAULT_CORES PROXMOX_DEFAULT_MEMORY_MB \
PROXMOX_DEFAULT_LXC_DISK_GB PROXMOX_DEFAULT_LXC_FEATURES \
PROXMOX_REMOTE_REPO_DIR
export PVE1_HOST PVE_TEST_HOST PROXMOX_HOST PROXMOX_SSH_USER PROXMOX_STORAGE \
PROXMOX_ISO_STORAGE PROXMOX_BRIDGE PROXMOX_DEFAULT_CORES \
PROXMOX_DEFAULT_MEMORY_MB PROXMOX_DEFAULT_LXC_DISK_GB \
PROXMOX_DEFAULT_LXC_FEATURES PROXMOX_REMOTE_REPO_DIR
# Matches variables.nix's nixCacheHost -- update both if it ever changes.
: "${NIX_CACHE_HOST:=nix-cache}"
+18
View File
@@ -34,3 +34,21 @@ flake_target_hostname() {
nix eval --raw "${NIX_EVAL_FLAGS[@]}" \
"${flake_ref}#nixosConfigurations.${target}.config.networking.hostName" 2>/dev/null
}
# flake_target_lxc_privileged <flake_ref> <target>
# Prints "true" or "false" for one lxc-* target's config.proxmoxLXC.privileged
# (modules/platforms/lxc.nix is the single source of truth -- e.g.
# lxc-docker sets this true so it can NFS-mount; every other lxc-* host
# stays unprivileged). Only meaningful for lxc-* targets -- the option
# doesn't exist for linode-*/proxmox-* (nixpkgs' proxmox-lxc.nix, which
# declares it, is only ever imported by modules/platforms/lxc.nix). Empty
# (not an error under set -e) if the eval fails.
flake_target_lxc_privileged() {
local flake_ref="$1" target="$2"
# Not --raw: the option is a Nix boolean, and --raw can only coerce
# strings ("cannot coerce a Boolean to a string"). Plain `nix eval`
# prints a bare `true`/`false` for a boolean, which is exactly the
# string this needs.
nix eval "${NIX_EVAL_FLAGS[@]}" \
"${flake_ref}#nixosConfigurations.${target}.config.proxmoxLXC.privileged" 2>/dev/null
}
+38 -10
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,17 @@
# copies over the locally-managed host-keys/ (gitignored, so a git pull
# alone wouldn't carry it) before building.
#
# --node (default: $PROXMOX_HOST, see scripts/env.sh) picks which of the two
# LAN Proxmox nodes this runs against: production, pve1.sweet.home
# ($PVE1_HOST, PROXMOX_HOST's own default), or the sandbox node,
# pve-test.sweet.home ($PVE_TEST_HOST) -- pass --node "$PVE_TEST_HOST" (or
# set PROXMOX_HOST=$PVE_TEST_HOST) to target the sandbox instead. See
# CLAUDE.md's "Two Proxmox nodes" section: an agent session should default
# to pve-test and only touch pve1 when the operator has explicitly said so
# for the current task -- this script itself doesn't enforce that (its own
# default is production, matching this repo's behavior before pve-test
# existed), it's a policy for whoever/whatever is driving it.
#
# Usage:
# scripts/proxmox/create-proxmox-resource.sh --type lxc|vm --host <name> [options]
# scripts/proxmox/create-proxmox-resource.sh --type lxc|vm --list
@@ -120,7 +131,9 @@ Shared:
--iso-storage <pool> (default: \$PROXMOX_ISO_STORAGE, ${PROXMOX_ISO_STORAGE})
--bridge <bridge> (default: \$PROXMOX_BRIDGE, ${PROXMOX_BRIDGE})
--node <host> Proxmox node to SSH into (default:
\$PROXMOX_HOST, ${PROXMOX_HOST})
\$PROXMOX_HOST, ${PROXMOX_HOST} --
production; the sandbox node is
\$PVE_TEST_HOST, ${PVE_TEST_HOST}).
--dry-run Print the full plan; touch nothing
local or remote, no prompts.
-h, --help
@@ -766,13 +779,22 @@ if [[ "$type" == "lxc" ]]; then
# 512M default otherwise (confirmed live: --memory 2048 left swap at
# 512). Default to matching whatever --memory resolved to above.
local_swap="${swap:-$memory}"
# --unprivileged 1: modules/platforms/lxc.nix sets proxmoxLXC.privileged
# = false, so the NixOS config inside the image assumes it's running as
# an unprivileged container (cgroup/capability/mount expectations baked
# in at boot). `pct create`'s own CLI default for this flag is
# privileged (unlike the web UI, which defaults its checkbox the other
# way) -- leaving it unset creates a privileged container running a
# NixOS config that assumes unprivileged, a real mismatch.
# --unprivileged: read back from modules/platforms/lxc.nix's own
# proxmoxLXC.privileged (via flake_target_lxc_privileged) rather than
# hardcoded, since that's no longer the same for every lxc-* target --
# lxc-docker sets it true so the container's NFS mounts work at all (the
# kernel's NFS client can't mount from inside any unprivileged
# container's user namespace, no matter what AppArmor allows -- see that
# option's own comment). The NixOS config inside the image bakes in
# cgroup/capability/mount expectations matching whichever value it was
# built with, so this must stay in sync with it -- `pct create`'s own
# CLI default for this flag is privileged (unlike the web UI, which
# defaults its checkbox the other way), so leaving it unset would create
# a privileged container running a NixOS config that assumes
# unprivileged for every target except lxc-docker, a real mismatch.
privileged_eval="$(flake_target_lxc_privileged "$repo_root" "$flake_target")"
unprivileged_flag=1
[[ "$privileged_eval" == "true" ]] && unprivileged_flag=0
#
# --features nesting=1,keyctl=1: required for a modern (v247+) systemd
# guest to actually boot unprivileged -- confirmed live: without this,
@@ -790,16 +812,22 @@ if [[ "$type" == "lxc" ]]; then
# hands the whole string to `ssh` as a single command for the *remote*
# shell to parse -- unquoted, that `;` would be read as a remote
# command separator and silently truncate this into two commands.
create_cmd="pct create ${vmid} ${iso_storage}:vztmpl/${remote_filename} --unprivileged 1 --features '${PROXMOX_DEFAULT_LXC_FEATURES}' --rootfs ${storage}:${local_disk_size} --hostname ${name} --cores ${cores} --memory ${memory} --swap ${local_swap} --net0 name=eth0,bridge=${bridge},ip=dhcp"
create_cmd="pct create ${vmid} ${iso_storage}:vztmpl/${remote_filename} --unprivileged ${unprivileged_flag} --features '${PROXMOX_DEFAULT_LXC_FEATURES}' --rootfs ${storage}:${local_disk_size} --hostname ${name} --cores ${cores} --memory ${memory} --swap ${local_swap} --net0 name=eth0,bridge=${bridge},ip=dhcp"
remote "$create_cmd"
remote "pct start ${vmid}"
else
echo "==> Creating VM ${vmid} (${name})..."
# pre-enrolled-keys=0 disables OVMF's Secure Boot key pre-enrollment --
# required, or systemd-boot (unsigned) can't be trusted by the firmware.
# --agent 1: wires up the virtio-serial channel QEMU exposes to the guest.
# modules/common/configuration.nix sets services.qemuGuest.enable = true
# on every host, so the guest-side qemu-ga daemon is already running --
# without this flag Proxmox never creates the channel it listens on, so
# `qm guest exec`/`qm agent` and the UI's IP-address display silently
# never work for any VM this script creates.
remote "qm create ${vmid} --name ${name} --memory ${memory} --cores ${cores} \
--net0 virtio,bridge=${bridge} --bios ovmf --machine q35 --scsihw virtio-scsi-pci \
--efidisk0 ${storage}:1,efitype=4m,pre-enrolled-keys=0"
--efidisk0 ${storage}:1,efitype=4m,pre-enrolled-keys=0 --agent enabled=1"
if [[ "$dry_run" -eq 1 ]]; then
echo "[dry-run] ssh ${ssh_target} -- qm importdisk ${vmid} ${remote_path} ${storage}"
+77 -50
View File
@@ -5,94 +5,121 @@ sops:
age:
- enc: |
-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
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S/zM+fDQdS1qlg3Bp/GofCpeKpmERe/SLMlib5LgCUCWyxB+2IPPKw==
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14kSrKmKlzefTrbkVyriz2Jdl2s0F374yfQQFreZ3m4AffSACCxziQ==
-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
recipient: age1njap586hc0q43kr03g6c8eqhdsmk8zcafkl3f83xwlc2gqhlmfgs4tmwad
- enc: |
-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSBBbDhMaUNNMk9MY2FPUm51
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View File
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