Archived
Merge branch 'main' into worktree-claude-md-pve-guardrails
Check NixOS configurations / eval-hosts (pull_request) Successful in 10m18s
Check NixOS configurations / eval-hosts (pull_request) Successful in 10m18s
This commit is contained in:
@@ -13,24 +13,6 @@
|
||||
|
||||
networking.networkmanager.enable = true; # Easiest to use and most distros use this by default.
|
||||
|
||||
# No host declares a DNS search domain anywhere else, and cross-host
|
||||
# references throughout this repo (vars.nfsServerHost, vars.nixCacheHost,
|
||||
# vars.dockerHost, ...) are bare short names, not FQDNs -- resolving them
|
||||
# depends entirely on whatever network stack happens to be in play
|
||||
# picking up the DHCP-advertised domain as a search suffix. NetworkManager
|
||||
# does that by default, which is why this went unnoticed on
|
||||
# NetworkManager-managed hosts, but LXC containers (modules/platforms/lxc.nix
|
||||
# force-disables NetworkManager and Proxmox writes their systemd-networkd
|
||||
# config itself) never get one. Confirmed live on lxc-docker: systemd-resolved
|
||||
# had no search domain for eth0, "server" failed to resolve
|
||||
# ("Name or service not known") while "server.sweet.home" resolved fine via
|
||||
# the same DNS server, so every NFS mount in modules/docker/mount-data.nix
|
||||
# failed even after fixing the automount/mount=nfs bugs. This applies the
|
||||
# search domain globally via systemd-resolved's own config rather than the
|
||||
# per-link DHCP path, so it isn't at the mercy of whichever component owns
|
||||
# a given host's interface file.
|
||||
networking.search = [ vars.homeDomain ];
|
||||
|
||||
# Recommended over the true default (bypasses ZFS's own import safeguards)
|
||||
# per the option's own docs; matches hosts/docker/host.nix and
|
||||
# modules/services/zfs/enable-service.nix, which already set this
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -9,11 +9,25 @@ let
|
||||
# (the VM platforms rely on automount itself to get that same
|
||||
# non-blocking behavior, so they don't need `nofail` too).
|
||||
automountOpts = if config.boot.isContainer then [ "nofail" ] else [ "x-systemd.automount" ];
|
||||
|
||||
# A bare hostname here never resolves reliably: systemd-resolved only
|
||||
# ever tries LLMNR for single-label names (never DNS, regardless of any
|
||||
# configured search domain), and a *global* search domain (the first fix
|
||||
# attempted here) backfires worse -- confirmed live on lxc-docker, adding
|
||||
# `networking.search` made systemd-resolved prioritize its domain-matched
|
||||
# but server-less global scope over eth0's correctly-configured one for
|
||||
# every "*.sweet.home" query, silently sending them to public fallback
|
||||
# DNS instead. `resolvectl query --interface=eth0 server.sweet.home`
|
||||
# resolved fine throughout, proving the LAN DNS server was never the
|
||||
# problem -- only the ambient, unqualified device string was. Using the
|
||||
# FQDN directly sidesteps all of that, matching the pattern
|
||||
# ../raspi/mount-data.nix already uses for the same reason.
|
||||
nfsServer = "${vars.nfsServerHost}.${vars.homeDomain}";
|
||||
in
|
||||
{
|
||||
fileSystems = {
|
||||
${vars.nfsShares.dockerConfig.mountpoint} = {
|
||||
device = "${vars.nfsServerHost}:${vars.storageRoot}/${vars.nfsShares.dockerConfig.subpath}";
|
||||
device = "${nfsServer}:${vars.storageRoot}/${vars.nfsShares.dockerConfig.subpath}";
|
||||
fsType = "nfs";
|
||||
|
||||
options = [
|
||||
@@ -24,7 +38,7 @@ in
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
${vars.nfsShares.dockerDatabases.mountpoint} = {
|
||||
device = "${vars.nfsServerHost}:${vars.storageRoot}/${vars.nfsShares.dockerDatabases.subpath}";
|
||||
device = "${nfsServer}:${vars.storageRoot}/${vars.nfsShares.dockerDatabases.subpath}";
|
||||
fsType = "nfs";
|
||||
|
||||
options = [
|
||||
@@ -35,7 +49,7 @@ in
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
${vars.nfsShares.dockerVolumes.mountpoint} = {
|
||||
device = "${vars.nfsServerHost}:${vars.storageRoot}/${vars.nfsShares.dockerVolumes.subpath}";
|
||||
device = "${nfsServer}:${vars.storageRoot}/${vars.nfsShares.dockerVolumes.subpath}";
|
||||
fsType = "nfs";
|
||||
|
||||
options = [
|
||||
@@ -46,7 +60,7 @@ in
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
${vars.nfsShares.nextcloudData.mountpoint} = {
|
||||
device = "${vars.nfsServerHost}:${vars.storageRoot}/${vars.nfsShares.nextcloudData.subpath}";
|
||||
device = "${nfsServer}:${vars.storageRoot}/${vars.nfsShares.nextcloudData.subpath}";
|
||||
fsType = "nfs";
|
||||
|
||||
options = [
|
||||
@@ -57,7 +71,7 @@ in
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
${vars.nfsShares.raspiVolumes.mountpoint} = {
|
||||
device = "${vars.nfsServerHost}:${vars.storageRoot}/${vars.nfsShares.raspiVolumes.subpath}";
|
||||
device = "${nfsServer}:${vars.storageRoot}/${vars.nfsShares.raspiVolumes.subpath}";
|
||||
fsType = "nfs";
|
||||
|
||||
options = [
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
{ lib, modulesPath, flakeTarget, ... }:
|
||||
{ config, lib, modulesPath, flakeTarget, ... }:
|
||||
|
||||
let
|
||||
# Bakes this exact flake target's pre-generated SSH host key straight
|
||||
@@ -58,8 +58,28 @@ in
|
||||
# host.nix declares each host's real hostname (networking.hostName);
|
||||
# keep that instead of letting Proxmox's ambient container config win.
|
||||
manageHostName = true;
|
||||
# Unprivileged matches how these containers are actually created.
|
||||
privileged = false;
|
||||
# Unprivileged by default -- matches how these containers are actually
|
||||
# created (scripts/proxmox/create-proxmox-resource.sh reads this value
|
||||
# back to decide `pct create`'s --unprivileged flag, so the two stay
|
||||
# in sync).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# lxc-docker is the one exception: the kernel's NFS client doesn't set
|
||||
# FS_USERNS_MOUNT, so mounting NFS from inside *any* non-init user
|
||||
# namespace -- which is exactly what an unprivileged container's
|
||||
# UID-mapped root runs in -- is rejected at the VFS layer with EPERM,
|
||||
# no matter what Proxmox's own `mount=nfs;nfs4` container feature
|
||||
# allows at the AppArmor layer (confirmed live: TCP to the NFS server
|
||||
# succeeds, the server's export table matches the container's IP, and
|
||||
# `mount.nfs: Operation not permitted` still fires immediately with no
|
||||
# corresponding denial anywhere in the server's logs -- a kernel-level
|
||||
# rejection, not a network or export-permission one). Keying off
|
||||
# hostName rather than something docker-build-type-specific because
|
||||
# modules/build-types/docker.nix is also composed for linode-docker/
|
||||
# proxmox-docker, which don't import proxmox-lxc.nix at all --setting
|
||||
# this option there would break their eval with "option does not
|
||||
# exist" regardless of any mkIf guard, since mkIf only makes a value
|
||||
# conditional, not whether the option needs to exist somewhere.
|
||||
privileged = config.networking.hostName == "docker";
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
boot.loader = {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -34,3 +34,21 @@ flake_target_hostname() {
|
||||
nix eval --raw "${NIX_EVAL_FLAGS[@]}" \
|
||||
"${flake_ref}#nixosConfigurations.${target}.config.networking.hostName" 2>/dev/null
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# flake_target_lxc_privileged <flake_ref> <target>
|
||||
# Prints "true" or "false" for one lxc-* target's config.proxmoxLXC.privileged
|
||||
# (modules/platforms/lxc.nix is the single source of truth -- e.g.
|
||||
# lxc-docker sets this true so it can NFS-mount; every other lxc-* host
|
||||
# stays unprivileged). Only meaningful for lxc-* targets -- the option
|
||||
# doesn't exist for linode-*/proxmox-* (nixpkgs' proxmox-lxc.nix, which
|
||||
# declares it, is only ever imported by modules/platforms/lxc.nix). Empty
|
||||
# (not an error under set -e) if the eval fails.
|
||||
flake_target_lxc_privileged() {
|
||||
local flake_ref="$1" target="$2"
|
||||
# Not --raw: the option is a Nix boolean, and --raw can only coerce
|
||||
# strings ("cannot coerce a Boolean to a string"). Plain `nix eval`
|
||||
# prints a bare `true`/`false` for a boolean, which is exactly the
|
||||
# string this needs.
|
||||
nix eval "${NIX_EVAL_FLAGS[@]}" \
|
||||
"${flake_ref}#nixosConfigurations.${target}.config.proxmoxLXC.privileged" 2>/dev/null
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -766,13 +766,22 @@ if [[ "$type" == "lxc" ]]; then
|
||||
# 512M default otherwise (confirmed live: --memory 2048 left swap at
|
||||
# 512). Default to matching whatever --memory resolved to above.
|
||||
local_swap="${swap:-$memory}"
|
||||
# --unprivileged 1: modules/platforms/lxc.nix sets proxmoxLXC.privileged
|
||||
# = false, so the NixOS config inside the image assumes it's running as
|
||||
# an unprivileged container (cgroup/capability/mount expectations baked
|
||||
# in at boot). `pct create`'s own CLI default for this flag is
|
||||
# privileged (unlike the web UI, which defaults its checkbox the other
|
||||
# way) -- leaving it unset creates a privileged container running a
|
||||
# NixOS config that assumes unprivileged, a real mismatch.
|
||||
# --unprivileged: read back from modules/platforms/lxc.nix's own
|
||||
# proxmoxLXC.privileged (via flake_target_lxc_privileged) rather than
|
||||
# hardcoded, since that's no longer the same for every lxc-* target --
|
||||
# lxc-docker sets it true so the container's NFS mounts work at all (the
|
||||
# kernel's NFS client can't mount from inside any unprivileged
|
||||
# container's user namespace, no matter what AppArmor allows -- see that
|
||||
# option's own comment). The NixOS config inside the image bakes in
|
||||
# cgroup/capability/mount expectations matching whichever value it was
|
||||
# built with, so this must stay in sync with it -- `pct create`'s own
|
||||
# CLI default for this flag is privileged (unlike the web UI, which
|
||||
# defaults its checkbox the other way), so leaving it unset would create
|
||||
# a privileged container running a NixOS config that assumes
|
||||
# unprivileged for every target except lxc-docker, a real mismatch.
|
||||
privileged_eval="$(flake_target_lxc_privileged "$repo_root" "$flake_target")"
|
||||
unprivileged_flag=1
|
||||
[[ "$privileged_eval" == "true" ]] && unprivileged_flag=0
|
||||
#
|
||||
# --features nesting=1,keyctl=1: required for a modern (v247+) systemd
|
||||
# guest to actually boot unprivileged -- confirmed live: without this,
|
||||
@@ -790,7 +799,7 @@ if [[ "$type" == "lxc" ]]; then
|
||||
# hands the whole string to `ssh` as a single command for the *remote*
|
||||
# shell to parse -- unquoted, that `;` would be read as a remote
|
||||
# command separator and silently truncate this into two commands.
|
||||
create_cmd="pct create ${vmid} ${iso_storage}:vztmpl/${remote_filename} --unprivileged 1 --features '${PROXMOX_DEFAULT_LXC_FEATURES}' --rootfs ${storage}:${local_disk_size} --hostname ${name} --cores ${cores} --memory ${memory} --swap ${local_swap} --net0 name=eth0,bridge=${bridge},ip=dhcp"
|
||||
create_cmd="pct create ${vmid} ${iso_storage}:vztmpl/${remote_filename} --unprivileged ${unprivileged_flag} --features '${PROXMOX_DEFAULT_LXC_FEATURES}' --rootfs ${storage}:${local_disk_size} --hostname ${name} --cores ${cores} --memory ${memory} --swap ${local_swap} --net0 name=eth0,bridge=${bridge},ip=dhcp"
|
||||
remote "$create_cmd"
|
||||
remote "pct start ${vmid}"
|
||||
else
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user