Migrate live secrets to sops-nix (Milestone 2)

Audited the working tree and full git history for committed secrets (gitleaks + trufflehog + manual grep, see secrets-inventory.md, kept local/gitignored per the spec). Found: a password hash shared by root and the nixos user across every host, two live Beszel monitoring tokens, and a GitHub fine-grained PAT embedded in a home-manager nix.conf. Migrates all of them to sops-nix: - .sops.yaml + secrets/*.yaml, encrypted for admin + the age keys derived (via ssh-to-age) from each live host's existing SSH host key — no new key material transferred to any machine. - users.users.{root,nixos}.hashedPasswordFile replaces the inline hashedPassword shared by every target. - The GitHub PAT moves from a home-manager-managed, store-visible nix.conf to a sops.templates-rendered file included via nix.conf's native !include, system-wide instead of per-user. - Beszel TOKEN moves from `environment` (store-visible) to `environmentFile` (runtime-only via sops.templates); the dead commented-out docker token is removed from the tree entirely. Added a tracked pre-commit hook (gitleaks protect --staged, wired via core.hooksPath) so a secret can't be committed by accident again, and documented the sops workflow in README.md. Structural verification only: all 17 flake targets evaluate, and `nix build --dry-run --no-link` succeeds for the three currently deployed hosts. Per CLAUDE.md, actual `nixos-rebuild switch` — the step that confirms secrets decrypt and services start on a real machine — is left for manual verification. Git history still contains the original plaintext secrets; scrubbing history (Milestone 3) and rotating every credential (Milestone 4) are separate, deliberately gated steps per remove-sensetive-info-refactor.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-19 12:46:39 +10:00
parent c05e3a3821
commit 2f7831aea8
16 changed files with 375 additions and 19 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Blocks commits containing secrets. Installed via:
+#   git config core.hooksPath .githooks
+# (scripts/codex-setup.sh does this automatically in Codex sessions.)
+set -euo pipefail
+
+if command -v gitleaks >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  gitleaks protect --staged -v
+else
+  nix-shell -p gitleaks --run "gitleaks protect --staged -v"
+fi
@@ -9,3 +9,7 @@ result-*
 auto-installer/flake.lock
 auto-installer/result
 auto-installer/nixos-auto.iso
+
+# Temporary Milestone 1 audit checklist (remove-sensetive-info-refactor.md)
+# - working notes only, never committed, deleted once every row is rotated.
+secrets-inventory.md
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+keys:
+  - &admin age10nd382a9klsn2mrs60emdtsxe43pht3a0m9p29phfrhy0wfyt3vsq9r667
+  - &docker age19gfn2yedg76dmztm4hncr7vf3r3c9j0qpt4rap7y7gersjk4m3ks2lhd0e
+  - &server age1ll6hj5ggruetgjwjfnplpn5xtq35uhlcdflksx3xmnjm6s3uad9sz70jkf
+  - &nix-cache age120le4a5l8dh3lyfgvmj3d9ksmej6ajs5mer5y7r0vfg3x9fn69dqf8xgzu
+
+creation_rules:
+  # Shared across every currently-deployed host: root/nixos password hash,
+  # GitHub access token. Same value on every host today, so every live host's
+  # key can decrypt it (matches current risk profile — narrow further in
+  # Milestone 4 if hosts should diverge).
+  - path_regex: secrets/common\.yaml$
+    key_groups:
+      - age:
+          - *admin
+          - *docker
+          - *server
+          - *nix-cache
+
+  - path_regex: secrets/nix-cache\.yaml$
+    key_groups:
+      - age:
+          - *admin
+          - *nix-cache
+
+  - path_regex: secrets/server\.yaml$
+    key_groups:
+      - age:
+          - *admin
+          - *server
+
+  - path_regex: secrets/docker\.yaml$
+    key_groups:
+      - age:
+          - *admin
+          - *docker
@@ -86,7 +86,25 @@ review sessions.

 ## Security Notes

-Do not commit tokens, private keys, live credentials, or new password hashes.
-This repository currently contains committed password hashes in shared NixOS
-configuration; rotate those passwords and move hashes into host-local secret
-management before treating the repository as public or widely shared.
+Do not commit tokens, private keys, live credentials, or new password hashes
+as plaintext. Secrets are managed with [sops-nix](https://github.com/Mic92/sops-nix):
+encrypted files live under `secrets/`, recipients (per-host age keys derived
+from each host's existing SSH host key, plus an admin key) are declared in
+`.sops.yaml`. To add or edit a secret:
+
+```bash
+nix-shell -p sops --run "sops secrets/<file>.yaml"
+```
+
+then reference it from a module via `config.sops.secrets."<name>".path`
+(or `sops.templates` for values that need to be embedded in a rendered
+config file, e.g. `nix.conf`'s `access-tokens`). Never write a secret value
+directly into a tracked `.nix` file. A pre-commit hook (`.githooks/`,
+enabled via `git config core.hooksPath .githooks`, done automatically by
+`scripts/codex-setup.sh`) runs `gitleaks protect --staged` to catch mistakes
+before they're committed.
+
+This repository's git *history* still contains secrets committed before this
+migration (see `remove-sensetive-info-refactor.md`) — those are being
+scrubbed and rotated separately; don't treat the repo as safe to make public
+until that's finished.
@@ -166,7 +166,8 @@
        "disko": "disko",
        "home-manager": "home-manager",
        "nixos-conf-editor": "nixos-conf-editor",
-        "nixpkgs": "nixpkgs_2"
+        "nixpkgs": "nixpkgs_2",
+        "sops-nix": "sops-nix"
      }
    },
    "snowfall-lib": {
@@ -192,6 +193,26 @@
        "type": "github"
      }
    },
+    "sops-nix": {
+      "inputs": {
+        "nixpkgs": [
+          "nixpkgs"
+        ]
+      },
+      "locked": {
+        "lastModified": 1783174389,
+        "narHash": "sha256-aCWC8ngycU7OdJrU2+Je3qf+1a2ykuBvpPhZT/9tXMc=",
+        "owner": "Mic92",
+        "repo": "sops-nix",
+        "rev": "f1406619a3884cd5c47992a70b8b35c9c0fcb4c9",
+        "type": "github"
+      },
+      "original": {
+        "owner": "Mic92",
+        "repo": "sops-nix",
+        "type": "github"
+      }
+    },
    "systems": {
      "locked": {
        "lastModified": 1681028828,
@@ -12,9 +12,13 @@
      url = "github:nix-community/disko";
      inputs.nixpkgs.follows = "nixpkgs";
    };
+    sops-nix = {
+      url = "github:Mic92/sops-nix";
+      inputs.nixpkgs.follows = "nixpkgs";
+    };
  };

-  outputs = { self, nixpkgs, nixos-conf-editor, home-manager, ... } @ inputs:
+  outputs = { self, nixpkgs, nixos-conf-editor, home-manager, sops-nix, ... } @ inputs:

    let
      system = "x86_64-linux";
@@ -31,6 +35,7 @@
          inherit system;
          modules = [
            inputs.disko.nixosModules.disko
+            sops-nix.nixosModules.sops
            ./modules/common/configuration.nix
            ./modules/platforms/${platform}.nix
            ./modules/build-types/${buildType}.nix
@@ -1,14 +1,19 @@
-{ ... }:
+{ config, ... }:

 {
  networking.hostName = "nix-cache";

+  sops.secrets."beszel-token".sopsFile = ../../secrets/nix-cache.yaml;
+  sops.templates."nix-cache-beszel.env".content = ''
+    TOKEN=${config.sops.placeholder."beszel-token"}
+  '';
+
  services.beszel.agent.environment = {
    #DOCKER_HOST = "tcp://docker-socket-proxy:2375";
    #HUB_URL = "http://docker.sweet.home:8090";
    KEY = "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIFPR9kwtC4TAeTRu46A7+opZsYpxqkRJ+x/ZyB2GWCeG";
-    TOKEN = "c9192e4c-7b5d-4910-8241-c2d68afadbac";
  };
+  services.beszel.agent.environmentFile = config.sops.templates."nix-cache-beszel.env".path;

  # Preserved from the pre-refactor `nix-cache` target — stateVersion must
  # never be bumped on an already-installed machine.
@@ -1,17 +1,22 @@
-{ ... }:
+{ config, ... }:

 {
  networking.hostName = "server";
  networking.hostId = "6689f93e";

+  sops.secrets."beszel-token".sopsFile = ../../secrets/server.yaml;
+  sops.templates."server-beszel.env".content = ''
+    TOKEN=${config.sops.placeholder."beszel-token"}
+  '';
+
  services.beszel.agent.environment = {
    #DOCKER_HOST = "tcp://docker-socket-proxy:2375";
    #HUB_URL = "http://docker.sweet.home:8090";
    KEY = "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIFPR9kwtC4TAeTRu46A7+opZsYpxqkRJ+x/ZyB2GWCeG";
-    TOKEN = "48e71783-35df-4ea0-a8c2-05bc5e020d2e";
    EXTRA_FILESYSTEMS = "/tank/docker/volumes";
    LOG_LEVEL = "debug";
  };
+  services.beszel.agent.environmentFile = config.sops.templates."server-beszel.env".path;

  # Preserved from the pre-refactor `server` target — stateVersion must never
  # be bumped on an already-installed machine.
@@ -5,7 +5,5 @@ services.beszel.agent.enable = true;
 services.beszel.agent.environment = {
 #DOCKER_HOST = "tcp://docker-socket-proxy:2375";
 HUB_URL = "http://docker.sweet.home:8090";
-#KEY = "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIA2Snq66P/6GwTEafKuu3D/V1f7ofjKL9GD6ik+Kf/Gn";
-#TOKEN = "235b3-25a94f482-84576-40d34c48";
 };
 }
@@ -25,9 +25,31 @@
  git
  gcr
  ];
+
+  # Secrets shared by every host, decrypted at activation via each host's
+  # existing SSH host key (sops-nix derives the age key from
+  # /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key automatically — see modules/common/README
+  # or docs/ for the sops workflow). hashedPassword/hashedPasswordFile need
+  # neededForUsers so they're available before the normal secret-activation
+  # step, since user creation happens very early in boot.
+  sops.defaultSopsFile = ../../secrets/common.yaml;
+  sops.secrets."root-hashedPassword".neededForUsers = true;
+  sops.secrets."nixos-hashedPassword".neededForUsers = true;
+  sops.secrets."nix-github-token" = { };
+
+  # nix.conf doesn't support a *File-style option for access-tokens, so the
+  # token is rendered into a runtime-only file (never touches the Nix store)
+  # and pulled in via nix.conf's native !include directive.
+  sops.templates."nix-github-token.conf".content = ''
+    access-tokens = github.com=${config.sops.placeholder."nix-github-token"}
+  '';
+  nix.extraOptions = ''
+    !include ${config.sops.templates."nix-github-token.conf".path}
+  '';
+
 #Set root password
 users.users.root = {
-  hashedPassword = "$6$Kwv9KAyvcurAViQF$H4.u3feqGE7lVoNgkFXhE3n2Pmo//9JYDTCz8ifrVHBxPjwa1xMby7tEZ8Bpt5MXs9Rkx6/YbZWxs5CpH0s/70";
+  hashedPasswordFile = config.sops.secrets."root-hashedPassword".path;
 };

  # Define a user account. Don't forget to set a password with ‘passwd’.
@@ -37,7 +59,7 @@ users.users.root = {
    packages = with pkgs; [
      tree
    ];
-    hashedPassword = "$6$Kwv9KAyvcurAViQF$H4.u3feqGE7lVoNgkFXhE3n2Pmo//9JYDTCz8ifrVHBxPjwa1xMby7tEZ8Bpt5MXs9Rkx6/YbZWxs5CpH0s/70";
+    hashedPasswordFile = config.sops.secrets."nixos-hashedPassword".path;
    openssh.authorizedKeys.keys = [
    "ssh-rsa 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 wayne@stream"
    "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAICMJhrfFayLBG+gWtO6oAvgambw5nWWgztiTFEaaaVRH debian@surface"
@@ -17,11 +17,10 @@ in {
  
 programs.bash.enable = true;
  
-  home.file = {
-    ".config/nix/nix.conf".text = ''
-      access-tokens = github.com=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
-    '';
-  };
+  # GitHub access-tokens setting used to live here in plaintext; it's now
+  # rendered system-wide from a sops-nix secret via nix.extraOptions in
+  # modules/common/configuration.nix instead (covers the daemon for every
+  # user, not just this one).

  # Optional: packages
  home.packages = with pkgs; [
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+# Spec: Remove Sensitive Information from NixOS Flake
+
+## Goal
+
+Every secret currently readable in plaintext anywhere in this repo (working tree *and* git history) gets removed, replaced with `sops-nix`-managed encrypted references, and rotated. When this is done, the repo should be safe to make public without exposing anything about the systems it configures.
+
+Treat this as three sequential milestones. Do not start git history rewriting (Milestone 3) until Milestones 1 and 2 are fully verified and the flake still builds. This should be its own branch (`refactor/secrets`) until fully verified, then merged.
+
+---
+
+## Milestone 1 — Audit
+
+Before touching anything, produce a complete inventory. Do not guess at scope — grep the whole tree and the whole history.
+
+1. Run a secret scanner across the working tree and full history. Use both, since they catch different things:
+   - `gitleaks detect --source . -v --log-opts="--all"` (scans history too)
+   - `trufflehog git file://. --since-commit=$(git rev-list --max-parents=0 HEAD) --only-verified=false`
+   If neither is installed, add them via a temporary `nix-shell -p gitleaks trufflehog` — don't install anything globally on the host.
+
+2. Manually grep for the categories below, since scanners miss config-specific patterns:
+   - `hashedPassword`, `password`, `initialPassword`, `initialHashedPassword` in any `users.users.*` block
+   - `age.secrets`, `sops.secrets` (if any partial secrets work already exists — check for it)
+   - PSK / `preSharedKey`, `privateKeyFile` inline values (vs. file references) for WireGuard
+   - `authKey`, `apiToken`, `api_key`, `token =`, `secret =` in service modules (Tailscale, Cloudflare, backup tools, etc.)
+   - SSH private key material: search for `BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY` / `BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY` literals
+   - TLS cert/key pairs committed under e.g. `secrets/`, `certs/`, `pki/`
+   - Real name, personal email, home address, or anything in comments/hostnames that maps a machine to your physical identity or network layout (e.g. hostnames like `wayne-desktop`, static LAN IPs, ISP-identifying info)
+   - `.env` files, `secrets.nix`, `secrets.yaml`, or any file that looks like it was meant to be gitignored but wasn't
+
+3. Produce `secrets-inventory.md` (temporary, delete before finishing) listing: file path, line, secret type, and which host/service it belongs to. This becomes the checklist for Milestone 2 — every row must be either migrated to sops or deleted, with nothing left unaccounted for.
+
+---
+
+## Milestone 2 — Migrate to sops-nix
+
+### 2.1 Set up sops-nix
+
+1. Add the flake input:
+   ```nix
+   sops-nix.url = "github:Mic92/sops-nix";
+   sops-nix.inputs.nixpkgs.follows = "nixpkgs";
+   ```
+2. Import `sops-nix.nixosModules.sops` into each host's module list (or into a shared `common.nix` if all hosts use it).
+3. Generate an age keypair **per host** (not one shared key for everything — a compromised host shouldn't decrypt every other host's secrets):
+   ```
+   nix-shell -p age --run "age-keygen -o /var/lib/sops-nix/key.txt"
+   ```
+   Print the public key (`age-keygen -y`) for each host — you'll need it for `.sops.yaml`.
+4. Also generate one age key for yourself (your admin workstation) so you can edit secrets without needing to SSH into a host: store it at `~/.config/sops/age/keys.txt`, back it up somewhere outside this repo (password manager, offline). **If this key is lost, every secret encrypted with it is unrecoverable — losing the age key is equivalent to losing the secrets.**
+5. Create `.sops.yaml` at the repo root defining creation rules: which age public keys can decrypt which secrets files, keyed by path regex, so e.g. `secrets/hostA.yaml` is decryptable by your admin key + hostA's key, `secrets/hostB.yaml` by your admin key + hostB's key.
+
+### 2.2 Migrate each secret category from the inventory
+
+For each row in `secrets-inventory.md`:
+
+- **Password hashes**: generate hash with `mkpasswd -m sha-512` (or `bcrypt` if your setup wants that), store under `sops.secrets."<name>/hashedPassword"`, reference via `users.users.<name>.hashedPasswordFile = config.sops.secrets."<name>/hashedPassword".path;`. Do not put the *plaintext* password anywhere, only the hash, and only the hash goes into the encrypted sops file.
+- **API tokens / auth keys**: move the raw value into the per-host sops YAML, reference in the module via `config.sops.secrets."<service>/token".path` — most NixOS service modules that take a token also accept a `*File` variant (e.g. `environmentFile`, `tokenFile`); use that instead of passing the value directly.
+- **Private keys / certs**: move the PEM/key content wholesale into a sops secret, output as a file with appropriate `sops.secrets.<name>.path`, `owner`, `mode`, `restartUnits` so the depending service (sshd, wireguard, nginx) reloads when the secret changes.
+- **Personal/identifying info**: this doesn't belong in sops (it's not "secret," it's just information you don't want public). Replace real names/emails with placeholders or move to a small untracked `local.nix` that's `.gitignore`'d and imported conditionally, with a documented template (`local.nix.example`) committed instead.
+
+### 2.3 Verify before moving on
+
+- `nixos-rebuild dry-build --flake .#<host>` succeeds for every host.
+- `sudo nixos-rebuild switch --flake .#<host>` on at least one real machine (or a VM) confirms secrets decrypt and services start.
+- Confirm decrypted secrets land under `/run/secrets/` (not the Nix store — anything placed in `/nix/store` is world-readable by design, so sops-nix's runtime-only placement is the whole point; double check no module accidentally pulls a secret path into a store-built config file).
+- Re-run the grep/scanner sweep from Milestone 1 against the *working tree only* (not history yet) — it should now come back clean.
+
+---
+
+## Milestone 3 — Scrub git history
+
+Do this only after Milestone 2 is merged to your main branch and confirmed working, since it rewrites every commit SHA from the point of the earliest offending commit onward.
+
+**This is destructive and irreversible on your local clone. Back up first:**
+```
+cp -r /path/to/nixos-repo /path/to/nixos-repo-backup-$(date +%F)
+```
+
+1. Install `git-filter-repo` (not the older `git filter-branch` / BFG — filter-repo is the currently maintained, faster, safer tool):
+   ```
+   nix-shell -p git-filter-repo
+   ```
+2. Use the `secrets-inventory.md` list to build a list of literal strings/paths to strip. Two approaches, use both:
+   - Path-based: if whole files were secret (e.g. `secrets.nix`, a `.env`, a private key file), remove them entirely from history:
+     ```
+     git filter-repo --path secrets.nix --path .env --invert-paths
+     ```
+   - Value-based: for secrets embedded inline in files you're keeping (not deleting the whole file), use `--replace-text` with a file listing each literal secret string to replace with `***REMOVED***`:
+     ```
+     git filter-repo --replace-text expressions.txt
+     ```
+3. After filtering, verify: run the Milestone 1 scanners again against full history (`--log-opts="--all"`). They must come back clean.
+4. Force-push the rewritten history:
+   ```
+   git push origin --force --all
+   git push origin --force --tags
+   ```
+5. **Every other clone of this repo (other machines, WSL instances, CI) must be deleted and re-cloned fresh** — a `git pull` against rewritten history will not work cleanly and risks resurrecting the old commits. Don't try to reconcile old clones; throw them away and re-clone.
+6. If this repo has ever been pushed to a public host (GitHub, etc.) or a fork/mirror exists, treat every secret that was ever in history as **permanently compromised regardless of the rewrite** — caches, forks, and Wayback-style archives can retain old commits indefinitely. History scrubbing prevents *future* exposure via `git clone`; it does not undo past exposure.
+
+---
+
+## Milestone 4 — Rotate everything
+
+Because the secrets were exposed in history (even briefly, even in a private repo), the migration is not complete until every credential in the inventory has been **rotated**, not just re-encrypted. Re-encrypting an already-leaked value protects it going forward but doesn't undo the leak.
+
+For each row in the original inventory:
+- Password hashes → change the actual account password, regenerate the hash, update the sops file.
+- API tokens/auth keys → revoke the old token in the issuing service's dashboard (Cloudflare, Tailscale, backup provider, etc.) and generate a new one.
+- SSH/WireGuard private keys → generate new keypairs, update the corresponding public key wherever it's trusted (authorized_keys, peer configs, etc.), retire the old ones.
+- TLS certs → reissue if the private key was exposed.
+
+Keep `secrets-inventory.md` open during this step and check off each row as rotated. Delete the file only once every row is checked off — it should not be committed.
+
+---
+
+## Ongoing prevention
+
+Add a pre-commit hook (or a `nix flake check` step) running `gitleaks protect --staged` so a secret can't be committed again by accident. Document in the repo README (briefly) that new secrets go through `sops <file>` to edit, never as plaintext in a tracked file.
+
+---
+
+## Definition of done
+
+- [ ] Milestone 1 inventory complete and reviewed
+- [ ] All hosts have per-host age keys; admin key backed up outside the repo
+- [ ] Every inventoried secret migrated to sops-nix, referenced via `*File`/`sops.secrets.*.path`, nothing plaintext in the working tree
+- [ ] `nixos-rebuild dry-build` and at least one real `switch` verified per host
+- [ ] Working-tree scanner sweep clean
+- [ ] History rewritten with `git-filter-repo`, force-pushed, full-history scanner sweep clean
+- [ ] All other clones deleted and re-cloned from the rewritten history
+- [ ] Every credential in the original inventory rotated (not just re-encrypted)
+- [ ] Pre-commit secret scanning hook added
+- [ ] `secrets-inventory.md` deleted from the working directory (never committed)
@@ -70,6 +70,9 @@ EOF
 echo "Nix version:"
 nix --version

+echo "Enabling tracked git hooks (pre-commit secret scan)..."
+git config core.hooksPath .githooks
+
 echo "Installing jq if unavailable..."
 if ! command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1; then
  nix profile install nixpkgs#jq
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+root-hashedPassword: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:Kp0nOZI7vDoLhJHiOJBwJn0rQZ5yhnwapGnAcA+qh8vlDETtFs/iQdetF/2ZxmANf62SviTNd+Ag0q5JIF1996x7onZGXqxgSMCuVzZLBdUlsO5IR0BslWWz47khYGTe4WkUg4NB1itBfQ==,iv:5Sra5vJ79V8hxQT3g9qJ+dOj2W2sumIhqpitqnHjJdk=,tag:3Igu0+8GeUZHqS3fKUVwog==,type:str]
+nixos-hashedPassword: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:pT7tVRN6X4a+DNUgB7fIUUE3CbnetkjxmoSL1PxSU+ktsFU+fB0mEvJjA1uujsGH5Rcztg7YM815+M0Z67ILmHaXbza5DtFacrqhi4/b277xly0SHRX4yOvBwQh6mJG1jn/0O/wvUUIYdw==,iv:bp2nfhC8nFbk6o5iWDAugvbzu7J/a1xayFnBEtkhNpE=,tag:HqWgkIpSrSM/K9OK2WO+VQ==,type:str]
+nix-github-token: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:OfNRGJg16Ede6EilWUetCs9za+xk5/Lsa3SpVajsqz8PMdA1xQNeCWdX7ZAMdijHClpBhU6ETFGsXvt41O9aORS951uijeGSW7/NH35/bnPISrKdYeBx/+xEiqwH,iv:QGU3v7xOy89uzRTCb1U9ICyJ8XYIpXrUsDt12aL3g2Y=,tag:Bde2wcWNv8H4WLxSEUAodg==,type:str]
+sops:
+    age:
+        - enc: |
+            -----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
+            YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSB6NkpZRzJuMFNuV09WamR0
+            SERDN0VSUlNQbkhSem1EeFlxdlhmdUx0S21JCnY1VkRBQTBqcW9JRHpJWEtJSitN
+            dHkyR0I4ckNkWkpGWHAzZGRaZkhJalEKLS0tIHRrU3RhU3UxN3B4NHdLeStuSXQ4
+            anFkRlpMTHowZzJNdnY0MExQcXd4OUEKgbT7uOSFkfEs6t3X6jmGOiC28lDJWF33
+            50f2fZ771ylhHa6WJMetGZ5cwl9r1RCaDiWyJEaqNGe7NqARlhr3EQ==
+            -----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
+          recipient: age10nd382a9klsn2mrs60emdtsxe43pht3a0m9p29phfrhy0wfyt3vsq9r667
+        - enc: |
+            -----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
+            YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSBDamw2ekY0dFZyOGNJelVa
+            ZGlNK2VNOWtWNTRzU3o2aVJvRi9CME5yS1JFCndlamdFMzVRTnoyVE1ZWXZkTjRR
+            eWdSZzZERHE5VElrOGZvcE4vK0g2d0EKLS0tIG15QlVyalZTK2NpVDdWWU4yUU4r
+            SkFncC9rZkNKUS9MSmF6WGQwOENwZTQKs5kLNLdQJoZtcsw3zlUWUUtJs0MJnuvw
+            o5vziOswRnuXENw//xN01nMDC6Ckzvb+q9GFIyxHLE4j3fT5XdZakg==
+            -----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
+          recipient: age19gfn2yedg76dmztm4hncr7vf3r3c9j0qpt4rap7y7gersjk4m3ks2lhd0e
+        - enc: |
+            -----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
+            YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSAyaWpWTGd4TEVoaHg4b3hm
+            S1o3VXdkYkZCS0QxcW5hUWxyVjFneE5aSmp3ClNsdEZoMHpPUzI4K3B0ZnBYMlEw
+            MkJyd2NPcGJDZzgvc1EyWFBhNVlGUVEKLS0tIEptYXI2bnJHZVZGR3hSSm1sMlN5
+            ay8wdUh6TEowL0ZiUWtqbXl3NzhYOVEKW9l4mr+MLhuXA8sgQndaU8NiFeCMcxhG
+            qjKFn+mu2GFbwfZWAy6y/KUd9Ug4H6y3pNHlJMHupTu8v2wZ+3S4EA==
+            -----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
+          recipient: age1ll6hj5ggruetgjwjfnplpn5xtq35uhlcdflksx3xmnjm6s3uad9sz70jkf
+        - enc: |
+            -----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
+            YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSAxVG13RVVweGpRM04vMWxG
+            V2hMMnp2Qk5Ub1BZQWNKNXVya3J4NGpreDJrCktqajVPRXdEL1BMU1dMbDhmU01L
+            UlQvRVQvcEFUZVZ5Umc3Y0hMUWNLVFEKLS0tIFgzRnF1RHdQdktDVjROSURYYTdx
+            NjAydjVuV1VCOGZoVFdTZmw1YmJ0eEEKN9KRGegafu1sjHlhyn4KCMPPAKxsSZLc
+            QJkei1ZQ0AVgC2QfCVEXonMOrs45nCIplG+uyER9khZyyjKObWk1pA==
+            -----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
+          recipient: age120le4a5l8dh3lyfgvmj3d9ksmej6ajs5mer5y7r0vfg3x9fn69dqf8xgzu
+    lastmodified: "2026-07-19T02:30:40Z"
+    mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:UiL3VMDF6rq4Nr87KspcDx434q3tfNXeb5pwH2O+4ssNQ6xzcYDdzXBnhAY3zLBsqPMKrvHBd4Ot/gEMcq3FMIVe7Q6p9yWKpep66KZ/yWEhAlwIVhD79Oj8VS+1CHKjf25zpRdhZorp04oeFQQd9VfjJB4EE/Q1aVbwTGlpIic=,iv:i/0conaFgFia+wzNTdUL6tlSTw35HTK3Ap1Sr5RGHf8=,tag:ULbz5FllShA/JjlSRdxA0g==,type:str]
+    unencrypted_suffix: _unencrypted
+    version: 3.13.1
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+beszel-token: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:meuzUP/6wCssJDVTgbC0XwiLZPMGyDl55HEIiON9xOXCD9k6,iv:TDqWcp+8Mxd8wN09r5otQRQXq3XTeQphaTWxvvuLTAs=,tag:cRPZQGlwB/dTguBAheWPQg==,type:str]
+sops:
+    age:
+        - enc: |
+            -----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
+            YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSBkb29VM3haQ0c0WDY0STVn
+            L1ZyOUROSnR6ZjZZZWc1VGFFNVp6bWxCV3hZCnlGTC9CbEtIM3MvSGJQaStEbzJ0
+            eWVhY2l6UHNDRTYxdEpkd003WXFia2MKLS0tIHcxU3FPYTVuZ0RqZTZTT1RvZnN0
+            OGlQM3B2R0l4MHhWNXBBWmpiOEVxK1EK8kxh3ikKL6Fw2am3r7lPGpB0fCqzEukO
+            NU10Cbf38Bd+fybRbBnvRuu9To1FOf+KU3iKbsuWmZn4KJn4Ajcbhw==
+            -----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
+          recipient: age10nd382a9klsn2mrs60emdtsxe43pht3a0m9p29phfrhy0wfyt3vsq9r667
+        - enc: |
+            -----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
+            YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSBCNWRhK2QrV1ZibllqY25Y
+            ZVRPLzZ0TE82TWZ4L0w5ZmFPTDBtT0poODBnCkE5TWhJcXJjNkdva1hYZ3loeVdq
+            UlBXWHZpRUpMSGhPU0FIRi9JMEtTdGMKLS0tIE9yUk5Ebjk2MEFtNEkyR3RDcU51
+            ZVMwNnNRMlBMVVFlamU1U3JQSy9UT00KJZdEpRHuj4Dp1dGwP1z4xi9oddQOrQj2
+            qheEN/IlifVdZDpvlLUc8jgLzd/TO5EeEhVqfbdrlua8FHly29oTNw==
+            -----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
+          recipient: age120le4a5l8dh3lyfgvmj3d9ksmej6ajs5mer5y7r0vfg3x9fn69dqf8xgzu
+    lastmodified: "2026-07-19T02:30:40Z"
+    mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:7+FeT6aeCGn+JFBXbPO0qP4BJ1nHPSennewv1kWkG+hOTIqs1ymuswUK1Hyfi6Z9h2umFX9HvK+o3qtmYvk6k7BUNe6w6QUHTNwm6lmNqrb7sgAE3iFVI2p9m14NGhgoTfnXx1M4JIZ1iuNYhCukpENI4+svIe+r7x5YeE5Evac=,iv:4AKAPI6upyAvHBr8BLWX7R/NupmJdcXdqiN8e0ZQ3ls=,tag:TkpfpCaLhn+Mx5cQZZuMdA==,type:str]
+    unencrypted_suffix: _unencrypted
+    version: 3.13.1
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+beszel-token: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:cbQOXhLzNk4g9d6hvm2DH7Q5ApTPCTzsW2txflDT2dD/UPIE,iv:V19MI1GEo5/0205Hrt7JImfkjduFiZ7f9aIkDVaI8mU=,tag:WCArgdrnIOudVe/Tw+oxRw==,type:str]
+sops:
+    age:
+        - enc: |
+            -----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
+            YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSBxaFZURjAxMGRJZEJ5MW1x
+            ZjVwWEQrQlkwNmRibVNiL2RpTTFLeUVDQ3hRCkVIamVnZkM1MnlueloxMHVFQnBF
+            RjV2bnUrZUo4WGZJTmR4Y0xITkxRUkUKLS0tIGlJdVQ5MFBubVhxRUVMWW0wSGpP
+            UGdKNUNPYW9nek1UZ0tWbXd3QVNUNDgKIHOiKelITQdH5R4Nc3WF7mzz15D1f9on
+            VaTdr5qkf8LNNvPI0fxsXA9is5cqeg+KbDRHtUumEhNp6Zrf8zWBkw==
+            -----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
+          recipient: age10nd382a9klsn2mrs60emdtsxe43pht3a0m9p29phfrhy0wfyt3vsq9r667
+        - enc: |
+            -----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
+            YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IFgyNTUxOSA3N0hvV01naytDSWVwK1B1
+            MXM1ZkdpaVc2Q3FPV2VBcC83WmcvSjdGUGgwClJGSXZ6YW5JeFlValNJbjVhK29u
+            bUFqN2dRQTI4ZkwyeXNWYk5JeWVJRXcKLS0tIDlMMkNBUnNUSTJwVVFmc2dlcEZS
+            VGQ1VHR2dXB0M3RsalppVWxiUUROM0UKZM/4QDTam3LDTzjnDs41Ije50R7Q7GC4
+            IZbUZjs72rBzY8IkJDbN9JidadEc4NAtMOJwXiJbpZGiCBNfc8+SXw==
+            -----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
+          recipient: age1ll6hj5ggruetgjwjfnplpn5xtq35uhlcdflksx3xmnjm6s3uad9sz70jkf
+    lastmodified: "2026-07-19T02:30:40Z"
+    mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:rKHZjU/MH08ASTlu32HZO9uWmsBYuMCEC6M8gwVhzuWvmablnP05tS2z13XfaWaCEUXk6kmGJKuU0zu5+IKVZgamCF6DAMtxQb6bVCaLsoAm/GSqWQ5VI9eHqgnSSdN/o3ul/33Rf8iBQo4aw8FFAmDVuNz8bfAn0QefFTj0ByI=,iv:JD2gtqRinOY77etg6PUmZNovkYl1Q3F6ZvRi4x7RznQ=,tag:/5IMpWKRVt+l1luCTQE0BA==,type:str]
+    unencrypted_suffix: _unencrypted
+    version: 3.13.1