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debian-configuration/docs/04-security-hardening.md
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beatzaplenty ba73420350 Document pve-test's wifi-primary network and add Claude node guardrails
pve-test was briefly clustered with pve1 then deliberately de-clustered
so it could move to wifi-primary networking (4addr bridge mode, bonded
with a wired LAN backup) - a change not achievable while clustered given
corosync's latency requirements. Captures that as a reproducible script
plus docs: cluster separation procedure, the wifi network design and the
live-cutover pitfalls hit along the way, and node-role/history context.

Also adds CLAUDE.md guardrails for pve1 (production) vs pve-test
(sandbox) - this repo had none before, despite scripts here being able
to make real changes to both.

Separately: both nodes' mgmt firewalls were dropping ICMP by default
(TCP 22/8006 only), which looked like an outage mid-troubleshooting even
though SSH/web UI were fine. Added an explicit ping-allow rule to the
firewall template, applied it live on both nodes, and added an audit.sh
check so it stays enforced.
2026-07-21 21:20:27 +00:00

106 lines
5.3 KiB
Markdown

# Security Hardening
Stage 1 (see `00-overview.md`) — applies to any Proxmox host, independent
of cluster plans. Proxmox has no `sudo` out of the box — everything
defaults to root. That's the install default, not the recommended end
state. Two layers to harden separately.
## Checklist / script mapping
Run `scripts/bootstrap.sh` for everything except the admin user (needs a
username decision) and 2FA enrollment (must be done interactively via the
web UI — there's no safe way to script TOTP secret generation over SSH).
Then run `scripts/audit.sh` to verify. Order matters (matches
`bootstrap.sh`):
| # | Item | Script | Manual step required? |
|---|------|--------|------------------------|
| 1 | Remove enterprise repos, switch to no-subscription | `switch-to-no-subscription-repo.sh` | no |
| 2 | SSH: key-only root login + fail2ban | `harden-ssh.sh` | no (requires an `authorized_keys` already in place — script warns if missing) |
| 3 | Unattended security upgrades, no auto-reboot | `setup-unattended-upgrades.sh` | no |
| 4 | PVE firewall, default-deny, mgmt-only SSH/8006 | `deploy-firewall.sh` | needs `MGMT_CIDR` set |
| 5 | Disable subscription nag (cosmetic) | `disable-subscription-nag.sh` | no |
| 6 | Named PVE admin user, Administrator role | `create-admin-user.sh <username>` | yes — pick the username, change the generated password on first login |
| 7 | 2FA/TOTP on that user and `root@pam` | — | yes — web UI only: Datacenter → Permissions → Two Factor, or user menu → TFA |
| 8 | Verify everything above | `audit.sh` | no |
## Linux/SSH layer
- `PermitRootLogin prohibit-password` in `sshd_config` — root can only
log in via SSH key, never password. Kills most brute-force attempts.
- fail2ban jail for SSH on top of that.
- Restrict SSH to the management VLAN/trusted IPs via the Proxmox
firewall (see `03-networking.md`) rather than exposing broadly.
- A separate Linux sudo user isn't strictly required for day-to-day PVE
admin (the PVE permission system below governs that), but worth adding
if multiple people SSH into the box directly, for accountability.
## PVE/web layer (the one that actually matters day-to-day)
- Keep `root@pam` for emergencies only.
- Create a named user (e.g. `wayne@pve`) with the Administrator role for
routine cluster management — `create-admin-user.sh` does this, or
Datacenter → Permissions → Users manually.
- Enable 2FA (TOTP or hardware key) on both that account and `root@pam`:
Datacenter → Permissions → Realms/Users.
- For API integrations (monitoring, automation, Terraform, etc.), issue
scoped API tokens with least-privilege roles (e.g. `PVEAuditor` or a
custom role) — never hand out root credentials.
## Firewall
Default-deny at datacenter/node level, whitelist only what's needed (see
`03-networking.md` for the specifics). Template in
`config/pve-firewall/cluster.fw.example`, applied by
`scripts/deploy-firewall.sh`.
**ICMP echo (ping) is explicitly allowed from the management network**,
alongside SSH/8006 — not required for anything to function, but without
it `policy_in: DROP` silently eats ping while SSH/web UI keep working.
That split (ping dead, everything else fine) reads exactly like a real
outage mid-troubleshooting; see `06-pve-test-wifi-network.md` for a case
this caused genuine confusion after a network change. If you ever debug
"can't ping but can SSH", check this firewall before assuming the
network itself is broken.
**This file is cluster-wide, not per-node**: `cluster.fw` lives in
`/etc/pve/firewall/` — shared via pmxcfs across every node in a cluster.
A node that joins a cluster inherits whatever's already there, and (per
`docs/05-node-roles.md`) keeps its own local copy after leaving. Don't
assume a node's firewall state matches what `deploy-firewall.sh` was
last run with directly against it — check `pve-firewall status` /
`/etc/pve/firewall/cluster.fw` on the actual node.
## Repos and updates
Fresh installs point at the enterprise repo, which fails on `apt update`
without a subscription. `scripts/switch-to-no-subscription-repo.sh`
removes the enterprise sources entirely (renamed `.disabled`, not just
commented out) and switches to the no-subscription repo — handles both
the legacy `.list` format and the deb822 `.sources` format current
installers write. Keep the host patched — hypervisor CVEs are high-value
targets; `scripts/setup-unattended-upgrades.sh` automates security
patches (deliberately no auto-reboot on a hypervisor — check
`/var/run/reboot-required` and reboot during a planned window).
The web UI's "No valid subscription" popup and dashboard indicator are
cosmetic upsell, not a security control, but with no subscription they'll
nag on every login — `scripts/disable-subscription-nag.sh` patches
`proxmox-widget-toolkit`'s JS to suppress them, and installs an apt
`Post-Invoke` hook that reapplies the patch automatically after every
`apt`/`dpkg` run, since a `proxmox-widget-toolkit` package upgrade
overwrites the patched file.
## Misc
- Management interface on a network you trust, not the same broadcast
domain as guest VM traffic.
- If the web UI is ever needed outside the LAN, put it behind a VPN —
don't port-forward 8006 directly.
## Further reading / not yet automated here
- CIS Benchmark for Proxmox VE
- Community PVE hardening guides (kernel parameters, audit logging,
storage encryption)