- modules/ipa/client.nix: add AuthorizedKeysCommand so sshd fetches SSH
public keys from IPA via sss_ssh_authorizedkeys, enabling pubkey login
without per-host authorized_keys files
- hosts/tailscale-router/host.nix: add IPA client module + networking.domain
so SSSD runs and wayne can authenticate on this host
- secrets/tailscale-router.keytab: sops-encrypted keytab for
tailscale-router.sweet.home (generated by create-nixos-ipa-host-account.sh)
- .sops.yaml: creation rule for secrets/tailscale-router.keytab
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds modules/ipa/client.nix — a parameterized module that joins a NixOS host
to the sweet.home FreeIPA domain without ipa-client-install. It configures
security.ipa (SSSD, Kerberos, PAM, NSSwitch) and places a pre-provisioned host
keytab via sops-nix binary secret so enrollment is fully reproducible from the
flake.
- variables.nix: adds ipaServer (FQDN of the FreeIPA KDC; security.ipa.server
requires a hostname, not an IP, for Kerberos/TLS)
- certs/ipa-ca.crt: placeholder for the IPA CA public certificate (operator
replaces with: curl http://<ipa-server>/ipa/config/ca.crt)
- secrets/nix-cache.keytab: placeholder binary sops file (operator replaces
with the encrypted keytab after ipa host-add + ipa-getkeytab)
- .sops.yaml: adds creation rule for secrets/nix-cache.keytab (same recipients
as secrets/nix-cache.yaml)
- hosts/nix-cache/host.nix: imports the IPA client module; adds
networking.domain so the host's FQDN resolves correctly
Module header documents the three operator steps needed per host before deploy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Wires beszel-agent into all tailscale-router variants (lxc/linode/proxmox)
by importing enable-agent.nix in the build type and host-token.nix in the
host file. Adds the sops creation rule for secrets/tailscale-router.yaml
(all three platform variants as recipients). The secrets file must be
created manually before deploying — see instructions in PR.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The previous Phase 4 commit had sed-mangled fingerprints for these two
targets (old and new fingerprints concatenated into one line). The correct
new fingerprints are:
- proxmox-minimal: age19m0m7vdfg... (freshly generated, no prior key on pve1)
- lxc-gui: age1rrxqea6q6... (freshly generated, no prior key on pve1)
Re-run sops updatekeys on common.yaml and gui.yaml to match.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B2EJ4qTsM5KUqhS5c3GAwx
Remove four stale age key anchors from .sops.yaml that correspond to
non-lxc build-type variants that were never deployed (or are now
superseded by their lxc-* counterparts):
&docker → superseded by &lxc-docker (active running host)
&server → superseded by &lxc-server (active running host)
&nix-cache → superseded by &lxc-nix-cache (active running host)
&nix-minimal → superseded by &lxc-minimal (active running host)
Also remove the secrets/docker.yaml creation_rules block entirely since
that file does not exist.
Re-encrypt secrets/common.yaml, secrets/nix-cache.yaml, and
secrets/server.yaml with sops updatekeys to drop the stale recipients.
The four removed keys can no longer decrypt these files.
Update README.md and CLAUDE.md to clarify that deployed lxc-* hosts
now use clan vars (vars/per-machine/<target>/openssh/) rather than the
gitignored host-keys/ directory.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B2EJ4qTsM5KUqhS5c3GAwx
Complete the rename so all identifiers match networking.hostName:
- flake.nix: attribute names and buildType strings
(linode/proxmox/lxc-tailscale-subnet-router → *-tailscale-router)
- modules/build-types/tailscale-subnet-router.nix → tailscale-router.nix
- .sops.yaml: anchor and alias names (age keys unchanged, no re-encrypt needed)
- host-keys/: local gitignored key files renamed (not committed)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add hosts/tor-relay/host.nix import of host-token.nix so the agent
gets its TOKEN from a sops-managed environment file
- Add secrets/tor-relay.yaml (encrypted beszel token for this host)
- Add creation_rules entry for secrets/tor-relay.yaml in .sops.yaml
- Update &lxc-tor-relay age key to the host's actual current key
(old key was from a prior LXC incarnation; new key extracted from
Switch-nix output: age1gl5ujmhd2pe37...)
- Re-encrypt secrets/common.yaml via sops updatekeys to swap in the
new key, so the host can decrypt its password hash on next boot
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Wires everything staged so far into a real flake target:
- modules/platforms/baremetal.nix (new): the bare-metal platform module,
composed from a real nixos-generate-config run on the actual gui-host
hardware (AMD CPU, ahci/xhci/usb storage -- modules/hardware-configuration/baremetal.nix).
Enables hardware.enableRedistributableFirmware (real wifi/GPU/microcode
firmware VMs never needed), amdgpu as the Xorg video driver plus
hardware.graphics for Mesa OpenGL/Vulkan, and imports the ZFS RAID0 disko
layout + modules/services/zfs/enable-service.nix for root-on-ZFS boot
support.
- flake.nix: new baremetal-gui target, reusing hosts/nixos/host.nix (same
identity already shared across linode/proxmox/lxc-gui).
- hosts/nixos/host.nix: added networking.hostId, required now that a ZFS
root pool is in the picture.
- variables.nix: guiRootDisk1/guiRootDisk2 filled in (/dev/sda, /dev/sdb --
only used transiently at disko-format time, same as modules/disko/proxmox.nix's
own plain device path). wifiPassword removed.
- modules/networking/wifi.nix: reworked to pull the wifi password from a
new sops secret (secrets/gui.yaml, wifi-password) instead of a plaintext
variable -- NetworkManager's ensureProfiles renders `psk = "$WIFI_PASSWORD"`
literally (nixpkgs' own documented pattern for this) and envsubst-expands
it from a sops-rendered EnvironmentFile at activation, so the real value
never touches the Nix store, only /run.
- .sops.yaml: new secrets/gui\.yaml rule, admin + the currently-registered
lxc-gui recipient (the only gui variant with a provisioned host key so
far -- whichever variant is actually deployed next still needs
scripts/secrets/sync-host-keys.sh run for its own recipient).
- README.md/CLAUDE.md: documented the new platform/target and its module
layout, per this repo's own drift-prevention note.
Verified end-to-end: nix eval of every existing target (nothing broke),
a temporary real nixosSystem build against the actual disko.nixosModules.disko
confirming the generated zpool create has no mirror/raidz keyword (genuine
stripe), and a temporary test SSID confirming the sops secret/template/
ensureProfiles chain renders correctly before reverting to blank/real values.
Full scripts/codex-maintenance.sh (secret-grep, fmt, statix, full-fallback
eval of every host/package) passes clean.
create-proxmox-resource.sh's `qm create` never passed --agent, so despite
services.qemuGuest.enable = true being set on every host, Proxmox never
created the virtio-serial channel the guest agent needs -- qm guest exec
and the UI's IP-address display silently never worked for any VM this
script created. Found while live-testing every lxc-*/proxmox-* build type
against pve.sweet.home for an end-to-end flake audit.
Also registers a fresh sops age key for lxc-gui (no prior registration
existed), generated while testing that target live -- needed before
lxc-gui can be deployed with working secrets.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CZHwwAM7cacQKkqKfQ5e8a
Adds the proxmox-minimal host's age key (derived from its SSH host
key via scripts/prepare-host-key.sh) as a recipient in .sops.yaml and
re-encrypts secrets/common.yaml for it via sops updatekeys.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01La55Nsss8jZ7ZuzUV9mfot
Audited the working tree and full git history for committed secrets
(gitleaks + trufflehog + manual grep, see secrets-inventory.md, kept
local/gitignored per the spec). Found: a password hash shared by root
and the nixos user across every host, two live Beszel monitoring
tokens, and a GitHub fine-grained PAT embedded in a home-manager
nix.conf.
Migrates all of them to sops-nix:
- .sops.yaml + secrets/*.yaml, encrypted for admin + the age keys
derived (via ssh-to-age) from each live host's existing SSH host
key — no new key material transferred to any machine.
- users.users.{root,nixos}.hashedPasswordFile replaces the inline
hashedPassword shared by every target.
- The GitHub PAT moves from a home-manager-managed, store-visible
nix.conf to a sops.templates-rendered file included via nix.conf's
native !include, system-wide instead of per-user.
- Beszel TOKEN moves from `environment` (store-visible) to
`environmentFile` (runtime-only via sops.templates); the dead
commented-out docker token is removed from the tree entirely.
Added a tracked pre-commit hook (gitleaks protect --staged, wired via
core.hooksPath) so a secret can't be committed by accident again, and
documented the sops workflow in README.md.
Structural verification only: all 17 flake targets evaluate, and
`nix build --dry-run --no-link` succeeds for the three currently
deployed hosts. Per CLAUDE.md, actual `nixos-rebuild switch` — the
step that confirms secrets decrypt and services start on a real
machine — is left for manual verification.
Git history still contains the original plaintext secrets; scrubbing
history (Milestone 3) and rotating every credential (Milestone 4) are
separate, deliberately gated steps per remove-sensetive-info-refactor.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
beatzaplenty
