create-proxmox-resource.sh's `qm create` never passed --agent, so despite
services.qemuGuest.enable = true being set on every host, Proxmox never
created the virtio-serial channel the guest agent needs -- qm guest exec
and the UI's IP-address display silently never worked for any VM this
script created. Found while live-testing every lxc-*/proxmox-* build type
against pve.sweet.home for an end-to-end flake audit.
Also registers a fresh sops age key for lxc-gui (no prior registration
existed), generated while testing that target live -- needed before
lxc-gui can be deployed with working secrets.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CZHwwAM7cacQKkqKfQ5e8a
.sops.yaml's &lxc-nix-cache anchor was rotated (commit b3c8145) after
today's LXC rebuild, but secrets/nix-cache.yaml was never re-run through
sops updatekeys -- it stayed encrypted for the pre-rotation key. Per
docs/nix-cache.md and docs/auto-installer.md, sops-nix decrypt failures
are silent: cache-priv-key never materialized, nix-serve had nothing to
bind its secretKeyFile to and failed to start, and nginx proxy_pass had
no upstream -- the 502 Bad Gateway seen from clients.
Confirmed the new key matches the currently-deployed host by deriving
the age identity from host-keys/lxc-nix-cache_ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub
via ssh-to-age and comparing to .sops.yaml.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
nix-serve's secretKeyFile was a manual, undocumented-outside-a-comment
`nix-store --generate-binary-cache-key` step per host -- easy to miss on
a fresh nix-cache instance (as lxc-nix-cache testing just found: systemd
fails the unit with EXIT_CREDENTIALS when LoadCredential can't find the
source file, which nginx then reports as a 502 from clients). It also
can't be regenerated per-host safely: modules/nix-cache/client.nix
hardcodes every client's trust in one specific public key, so every
nix-cache instance has to share the exact same keypair.
Sourced from secrets/nix-cache.yaml's new cache-priv-key entry instead,
via the same sops-nix pattern every other secret in this repo already
uses. Verified the added value derives to the exact public key
modules/nix-cache/client.nix already trusts before committing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01La55Nsss8jZ7ZuzUV9mfot
Adds the proxmox-minimal host's age key (derived from its SSH host
key via scripts/prepare-host-key.sh) as a recipient in .sops.yaml and
re-encrypts secrets/common.yaml for it via sops updatekeys.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01La55Nsss8jZ7ZuzUV9mfot
Audited the working tree and full git history for committed secrets
(gitleaks + trufflehog + manual grep, see secrets-inventory.md, kept
local/gitignored per the spec). Found: a password hash shared by root
and the nixos user across every host, two live Beszel monitoring
tokens, and a GitHub fine-grained PAT embedded in a home-manager
nix.conf.
Migrates all of them to sops-nix:
- .sops.yaml + secrets/*.yaml, encrypted for admin + the age keys
derived (via ssh-to-age) from each live host's existing SSH host
key — no new key material transferred to any machine.
- users.users.{root,nixos}.hashedPasswordFile replaces the inline
hashedPassword shared by every target.
- The GitHub PAT moves from a home-manager-managed, store-visible
nix.conf to a sops.templates-rendered file included via nix.conf's
native !include, system-wide instead of per-user.
- Beszel TOKEN moves from `environment` (store-visible) to
`environmentFile` (runtime-only via sops.templates); the dead
commented-out docker token is removed from the tree entirely.
Added a tracked pre-commit hook (gitleaks protect --staged, wired via
core.hooksPath) so a secret can't be committed by accident again, and
documented the sops workflow in README.md.
Structural verification only: all 17 flake targets evaluate, and
`nix build --dry-run --no-link` succeeds for the three currently
deployed hosts. Per CLAUDE.md, actual `nixos-rebuild switch` — the
step that confirms secrets decrypt and services start on a real
machine — is left for manual verification.
Git history still contains the original plaintext secrets; scrubbing
history (Milestone 3) and rotating every credential (Milestone 4) are
separate, deliberately gated steps per remove-sensetive-info-refactor.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
beatzaplenty
