Replace per-host host-token.nix imports with a single beszel-token secret
in secrets/common.yaml, wired once in enable-agent.nix. Host files now only
need services.beszel.agent.environment.KEY — no imports block required.
Delete modules/beszel/host-token.nix (no longer referenced anywhere).
Action needed: run `sops secrets/common.yaml` and add `beszel-token: <value>`
from the beszel hub UI before deploying.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
services.beszel.agent runs under DynamicUser=true with ProtectSystem =
"strict" and no StateDirectory, so /var/lib/beszel-agent -- where the
agent persists the fingerprint that locks its hub pairing to this
machine (github.com/henrygd/beszel/discussions/1542) -- was never
actually writable. Every restart silently failed to persist it and
regenerated a fresh one in memory, permanently desyncing from whatever
the hub had on record after the very first successful pairing. Affects
every host importing modules/beszel/enable-agent.nix (nix-cache, server),
not just full container rebuilds.
Found via nix-cache showing "fingerprint mismatch" after being rebuilt
post-outage; confirmed server was silently exposed to the same bug, just
hadn't restarted since its first pairing. Fixed by declaring
StateDirectory so systemd gives the dynamic user real persistent storage.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds nested vars.nfsShares (subpath + mountpoint per dataset, previously
duplicated independently across server.nix's NFS exports, mount-data.nix's
client mounts, docker.nix's tmpfiles rules, traefik's log rotation path,
and hosts/server/host.nix's beszel config), vars.ports (every literal port
in modules/ and hosts/, kept as separate entries per service even where
numbers coincide so changing one can't silently change another), plus
vars.proxmoxImageSize, vars.nixCacheGcMaxAge, vars.traefikLogRotate, and
raspberryPiHost/raspiNfsPath/raspiMountpoint for the Pi's own NFS export.
Also fixes docker.nix/minimal.nix/gui.nix hardcoding the literal "nixos"
username instead of the existing vars.primaryUser, found during the sweep.
system.stateVersion is deliberately left untouched everywhere -- per
NixOS's own docs that value must stay fixed from first install, not
follow any shared variable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01La55Nsss8jZ7ZuzUV9mfot
Pulls the beszel hub / PVE / PBS ports, the docker-compose host's LAN
name, and the remote-builder client SSH keys out of scattered inline
literals across modules/hosts and into variables.nix as the single
source of truth, matching the existing pattern for other cross-host
references (nixCacheHost, nfsServerHost).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01La55Nsss8jZ7ZuzUV9mfot
One file (variables.nix) holding every value that was previously
hardcoded and repeated across modules: LAN domain/CIDR, home/tailnet
domains, cross-host references (nix-cache substituter hostname, NFS
server hostname, remote-builder user), PXE/PBS IPs, timezone, and the
primary username.
Wired in via flake.nix's specialArgs (and home-manager's
extraSpecialArgs for the two home.nix files), so any module picks it
up by just adding `vars` to its function arguments — no explicit
import needed. Two hosts (nix-cache, server) now derive their own
networking.hostName from the same variable other hosts use to reach
them, so there's exactly one place to change either identifier.
Purely mechanical: every substituted value matches what was already
there, confirmed by identical toplevel .drv paths for all 17 targets
before and after.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Audited the working tree and full git history for committed secrets
(gitleaks + trufflehog + manual grep, see secrets-inventory.md, kept
local/gitignored per the spec). Found: a password hash shared by root
and the nixos user across every host, two live Beszel monitoring
tokens, and a GitHub fine-grained PAT embedded in a home-manager
nix.conf.
Migrates all of them to sops-nix:
- .sops.yaml + secrets/*.yaml, encrypted for admin + the age keys
derived (via ssh-to-age) from each live host's existing SSH host
key — no new key material transferred to any machine.
- users.users.{root,nixos}.hashedPasswordFile replaces the inline
hashedPassword shared by every target.
- The GitHub PAT moves from a home-manager-managed, store-visible
nix.conf to a sops.templates-rendered file included via nix.conf's
native !include, system-wide instead of per-user.
- Beszel TOKEN moves from `environment` (store-visible) to
`environmentFile` (runtime-only via sops.templates); the dead
commented-out docker token is removed from the tree entirely.
Added a tracked pre-commit hook (gitleaks protect --staged, wired via
core.hooksPath) so a secret can't be committed by accident again, and
documented the sops workflow in README.md.
Structural verification only: all 17 flake targets evaluate, and
`nix build --dry-run --no-link` succeeds for the three currently
deployed hosts. Per CLAUDE.md, actual `nixos-rebuild switch` — the
step that confirms secrets decrypt and services start on a real
machine — is left for manual verification.
Git history still contains the original plaintext secrets; scrubbing
history (Milestone 3) and rotating every credential (Milestone 4) are
separate, deliberately gated steps per remove-sensetive-info-refactor.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
beatzaplentyandClaude Sonnet 4.6