Merge pull request 'docs: update documentation for debian-configuration repo' (#4) from worktree-update-docs into main

Merge PR #4: docs update for debian-configuration rename

.gitea/workflows/secret-scan.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+name: Secret Scan
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: ["**"]
+  pull_request:
+    branches: ["**"]
+
+jobs:
+  secret-scan:
+    name: Scan for secrets and sensitive config
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          fetch-depth: 0   # full history for gitleaks git-log scan
+
+      - name: Install gitleaks
+        run: |
+          GITLEAKS_VERSION="8.21.2"
+          curl -sSL "https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks/releases/download/v${GITLEAKS_VERSION}/gitleaks_${GITLEAKS_VERSION}_linux_x64.tar.gz" \
+            | tar -xz -C /usr/local/bin gitleaks
+          gitleaks version
+
+      - name: Run secret scan
+        run: bash scripts/check-secrets.sh

.github/workflows/secret-scan.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+name: Secret Scan
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: ["**"]
+  pull_request:
+    branches: ["**"]
+
+jobs:
+  secret-scan:
+    name: Scan for secrets and sensitive config
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          fetch-depth: 0   # full history for gitleaks git-log scan
+
+      - name: Install gitleaks
+        run: |
+          GITLEAKS_VERSION="8.21.2"
+          curl -sSL "https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks/releases/download/v${GITLEAKS_VERSION}/gitleaks_${GITLEAKS_VERSION}_linux_x64.tar.gz" \
+            | tar -xz -C /usr/local/bin gitleaks
+          gitleaks version
+
+      - name: Run secret scan
+        run: bash scripts/check-secrets.sh

.gitleaks.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+# Gitleaks configuration for debian-configuration repo.
+# Extends the default ruleset with Pi-hole-specific secret patterns.
+# https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks
+
+title = "debian-configuration secret scan"
+
+[extend]
+  useDefault = true
+
+# ── Custom rules ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+[[rules]]
+  id          = "pihole-pwhash"
+  description = "Pi-hole password hash (pihole.toml webserver.api.pwhash)"
+  regex       = '''pwhash\s*=\s*"[^"]{10,}"'''
+  tags        = ["pihole", "password"]
+
+[[rules]]
+  id          = "pihole-totp-secret"
+  description = "Pi-hole 2FA TOTP secret"
+  regex       = '''totp_secret\s*=\s*"[^"]{10,}"'''
+  tags        = ["pihole", "2fa"]
+
+[[rules]]
+  id          = "pihole-app-pwhash"
+  description = "Pi-hole app password hash"
+  regex       = '''app_pwhash\s*=\s*"[^"]{10,}"'''
+  tags        = ["pihole", "password"]
+
+# ── Allowlist ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+[allowlist]
+  description = "Known-safe patterns in this repo"
+  regexes     = [
+    # TLS cert path reference — not the key itself
+    '''cert\s*=\s*"/etc/pihole/tls\.pem"''',
+  ]
+  paths       = [
+    # Example/template files are intentionally non-live
+    '''\.example$''',
+  ]

CLAUDE.md

@@ -1,84 +1,48 @@
 # CLAUDE.md
 
-Guidance for Claude Code working in this repo. IMPORTANT: these
+Guidance for Claude Code working in this repo. These instructions
-instructions OVERRIDE any default behavior and must be followed exactly
+OVERRIDE any default behaviour and must be followed exactly.
-as written.
 
 ## Repo purpose
 
-Base configuration/hardening toolset and planning docs for Proxmox VE
+Configuration toolsets and docs for Wayne's Debian-based LAN machines.
-hosts (`scripts/`, `config/`, `docs/`) — see `README.md` and
+Two sections currently exist: `proxmox/` (Proxmox VE hosts) and
-`docs/00-overview.md`. Scripts in this repo are meant to be run **on**
+`pihole/` (Pi-hole DNS/DHCP). Each has its own README.
-the target Proxmox host itself (as root), not orchestrated remotely.
 
-## Two Proxmox nodes: `pve1` (production) and `pve-test` (sandbox)
+## Safety rules (apply everywhere in this repo)
 
-Two SSH-reachable Proxmox nodes exist on the LAN. They are **not
+- **Never commit secrets.** SSH private keys, passwords, hashes, TOTP
-interchangeable** — see `docs/05-node-roles.md` for full background on
+  seeds, API tokens, or wifi passphrases must not appear in committed
-what each one is and why.
+  files. The CI pipeline (`scripts/check-secrets.sh`) enforces this on
+  every push; the pre-commit hook (`scripts/install-hooks.sh`) catches
+  it locally before it reaches the remote.
+- **`pihole/pull-config.sh` auto-sanitises** sensitive fields from
+  `pihole.toml` on every pull. If you write config to `pihole/config/`
+  by any other means, run `pihole/sanitize-config.sh` on the result
+  before committing.
+- **Scripts that SSH into live machines make real changes.** Don't run
+  `pihole/apply-config.sh` against a production Pi-hole, or any script
+  in `proxmox/scripts/` against `pve1`, without an explicit same-session
+  go-ahead from the operator. The section-specific CLAUDE.md files
+  spell out the per-host guardrails in detail.
 
-### `pve1` (production — off-limits to Claude by default)
+## Section-specific guidance
 
-A real, live Proxmox node hosting production VMs/containers (see
+- **Proxmox:** see `proxmox/CLAUDE.md` — covers `pve1` (production,
-`docs/05-node-roles.md` for the current guest list) — not a sandbox, and
+  off-limits by default) vs. `pve-test` (sandbox, Claude's default
-not Claude's to touch by default.
+  target), per-host authorisation scope, and network-surgery hazards.
+- **Pi-hole:** `pihole/` has no live-host guardrails beyond the secret
+  rules above. `apply-config.sh` is the only script that touches a live
+  host; treat its `<dest-host>` argument as production unless you're
+  explicitly testing on a throwaway instance.
 
-- **Off-limits at all times unless the operator has given explicit,
+## Adding a new machine type
-  same-session instructions to act on this specific host.** That
-  authorization is scoped to the task it was given for — don't carry it
-  forward to unrelated later work in the same conversation, and never
-  assume it from a previous session.
-- **Read-only for existing state is always fine, authorization or not.**
-  SSH in (or use `pvesm`, `qm list`, `pct list`, `qm config`, `pct
-  config`, the Proxmox API, etc.) to inspect config, storage, and any
-  existing VM/container freely.
-- **Never** modify, stop, restart, delete, reconfigure, or create
-  anything on this node (`qm set`, `pct set`, `qm destroy`, `pct
-  destroy`, `qm stop`, `pct stop`, `qm create`, `pct create`, snapshot
-  operations, storage changes, running any script in this repo against
-  it, etc.) without that explicit go-ahead. Use `pve-test` for anything
-  exploratory instead.
-- If a guest on `pve1` is HA-managed, be aware of the self-fence hazard
-  described in `docs/05-node-roles.md`'s cluster-teardown section before
-  doing anything that could cost the node quorum.
 
-### `pve-test` (sandbox — Claude's default target)
+Create a new top-level directory (e.g. `nginx/`, `wireguard/`) with:
+- `README.md` — purpose, quick-start, and current status
+- `CLAUDE.md` — host-specific guardrails (which hosts are production,
+  what requires explicit authorisation, what must never be committed)
+- `scripts/` and/or `config/` as needed
 
-A separate node set aside for testing — safe to create, interrogate, and
+Update the root `README.md` layout table and this file's
-destroy scratch VMs/containers on without asking first.
+"Section-specific guidance" list when you do.
-
-- **Test VMs/containers are allowed, but must be torn down.** Anything
-  created this way must be destroyed again in the same session, before
-  ending the task. Use an obviously-scratch VMID/name.
-- **Node-level config is still not yours to change by default.**
-  Creating/destroying your own scratch guests is fine; Proxmox host
-  config, storage pools, and networking on `pve-test` itself need the
-  operator's explicit go-ahead too, same as on `pve1` — the "sandbox"
-  status covers guest-level experimentation, not the host's own
-  identity. (`pve-test`'s current network config, `docs/06-pve-test-wifi-network.md`,
-  was applied under exactly that kind of explicit, same-session
-  authorization — it's not a standing invitation to keep changing it
-  further without asking again.)
-- **Never re-cluster `pve-test` with `pve1`** without the operator
-  explicitly asking for it and being aware of the wifi/corosync
-  incompatibility in `docs/06-pve-test-wifi-network.md` — the two were
-  deliberately de-clustered for this reason once already.
-
-## Safety rules
-
-- Any script in `scripts/` that isn't `audit.sh` (read-only) makes real
-  changes when run for real. Don't run one against `pve1`, or against
-  `pve-test`'s node-level config, without the same-session go-ahead
-  described above. Running a script *against pve-test's own guests* — a
-  scratch VM/CT you created for this task — doesn't need separate
-  permission.
-- Do not commit secrets: SSH private keys, wifi passphrases, sops/age
-  keys, or PVE credentials. `scripts/setup-wifi-bond-network.sh` takes
-  the SSID/passphrase via environment variables for exactly this reason
-  — never hardcode them into the script or a committed config file.
-- Live changes to a node's own management network (the interface/bridge
-  carrying the SSH session you're using) can strand the box — see the
-  "what went wrong once" section in `docs/06-pve-test-wifi-network.md`
-  before touching `pve-test`'s networking again. Prefer applying via
-  `ifreload -a` over raw `ip link` surgery, and arm an auto-revert
-  watchdog first when acting without someone physically at the console.

README.md

@@ -1,55 +1,46 @@
-# Proxmox Configuration
+# debian-configuration
 
-Base configuration and hardening toolset for Proxmox VE hosts, plus planning
+Configuration, hardening toolsets, and operational docs for Wayne's
-docs for eventually growing this into a 3-node HA/Ceph cluster. See
+Debian-based LAN machines. Each subdirectory covers a different host or
-`docs/00-overview.md` for the staging: **Stage 1** (base config/hardening,
+service type.
-applies to any host — active) vs. **Stage 2** (multi-node HA/Ceph — future,
-deferred).
 
-## Goals
+## Layout
-
-- Stage 1: a reusable, idempotent base-hardening toolset (`scripts/`) that
-  can be run against any new Proxmox host — repo/updates, SSH, firewall, PVE
-  user/access hardening — verified with `scripts/audit.sh`.
-- Stage 2 (future): 3-node cluster, quorum via corosync, HA-managed VMs
-  backed by Ceph. Needs dedicated hardware node 1 (`pve1`, an ASUS PN53 mini
-  PC) doesn't have — see `docs/01-hardware-node1.md`.
-
-See `CLAUDE.md` for the guardrails Claude Code follows when working
-against these hosts (`pve1` is production and off-limits by default;
-`pve-test` is the sandbox).
-
-## Repo layout
-
-- `docs/` — planning docs: hardware layout, storage migration, networking,
-  security hardening, node roles. Read `docs/00-overview.md` first, then
-  `docs/05-node-roles.md` for what `pve1`/`pve-test` actually are.
-- `scripts/` — scripts to apply configuration on a node (SSH hardening, repo
-  switch, firewall, updates, wifi/bond networking, etc). Idempotent, safe
-  to re-run. `scripts/bootstrap.sh` runs the full Stage 1 sequence end to
-  end; `scripts/audit.sh` verifies it (read-only).
-  `scripts/setup-wifi-bond-network.sh` reproduces `pve-test`'s wifi
-  network (see `docs/06-pve-test-wifi-network.md`). `scripts/lib/` holds
-  shared helpers (`common.sh`) sourced by the other scripts.
-- `config/` — reference config files/snippets to drop onto a node (firewall
-  rules, sshd config, etc.).
-
-## Quick start (Stage 1, on a fresh node)
 
 ```
-MGMT_CIDR=192.168.2.0/24 ./scripts/bootstrap.sh
+proxmox/   Proxmox VE hosts (pve1 production, pve-test sandbox)
-./scripts/create-admin-user.sh <username>
+pihole/    Pi-hole DNS/DHCP (config snapshots, pull/apply scripts)
-# then enable 2FA for that user + root@pam via the web UI
+scripts/   Repo-wide scripts (secret scanning, git hook installer)
-./scripts/audit.sh
 ```
 
-## Status
+## Sections
 
-`pve1` built (ASUS PN53 mini PC, ZFS mirror boot+VM storage, single
+### `proxmox/`
-2.5GbE NIC) and already running production VMs/CTs. Stage 1 base
+
-hardening applied and verified (`scripts/audit.sh` all green): enterprise
+Base configuration and hardening toolset for Proxmox VE hosts. See
-repos removed, SSH key-only + fail2ban, unattended security upgrades,
+`proxmox/README.md` for goals, quick-start, and current status.
-PVE firewall (mgmt-only), subscription nag disabled, named admin user
+
-(`wayne@pve`) created. Remaining manual step: enable 2FA/TOTP for
+### `pihole/`
-`wayne@pve` and `root@pam` via the web UI. Stage 2 (cluster/Ceph) not
+
-started — needs nodes 2/3 on hardware that can actually support it.
+Pi-hole v6 configuration management. Stores a sanitised snapshot of the
+live config and provides scripts to pull from or push to a running
+instance. See `pihole/README.md` for usage.
+
+## Secret scanning
+
+All commits are scanned for secrets by a CI pipeline that runs on both
+GitHub Actions and Gitea Actions. The same scan can be run locally:
+
+```bash
+# One-time setup — installs a pre-commit git hook
+bash scripts/install-hooks.sh
+
+# Manual run against the full git history
+bash scripts/check-secrets.sh
+
+# Requires gitleaks on PATH; falls back to Docker if available
+# https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks#installing
+```
+
+`pihole/pull-config.sh` automatically redacts sensitive fields
+(`pwhash`, `totp_secret`, `app_pwhash`) from `pihole.toml` before
+writing it to disk, so the repo stays clean by default.

pihole/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+# pihole
+
+Pi-hole v6 configuration management for `pihole.sweet.home`.
+
+## What's here
+
+```
+config/
+  pihole.toml                  Pi-hole v6 main config (sanitised snapshot)
+  dnsmasq.d/
+    99-ipxe-chainload.conf     Custom DHCP rules for EFI/BIOS iPXE PXE boot
+pull-config.sh                 Pull live config from a Pi-hole to a local dir
+apply-config.sh                Apply a local config dir to a Pi-hole instance
+sanitize-config.sh             Redact sensitive fields from pihole.toml in-place
+```
+
+## Usage
+
+### Snapshot the live config
+
+```bash
+# Pulls pihole.toml + custom dnsmasq.d/ drop-ins, auto-redacts sensitive fields
+./pull-config.sh root@pihole ./config
+```
+
+### Apply config to a new Pi-hole
+
+```bash
+# Destination must have Pi-hole v6 already installed
+./apply-config.sh ./config root@pihole-new
+```
+
+Both scripts take `<source> <destination>` as positional arguments.
+Source/destination is an SSH target (e.g. `root@pihole`, `root@192.168.2.253`)
+for the live side and a local directory path for the config side.
+
+### Restore blocklists after applying
+
+`apply-config.sh` transfers config only — not the gravity database.
+Run this on the destination after applying to rebuild blocklists:
+
+```bash
+ssh root@pihole-new "pihole updateGravity"
+```
+
+## Notable config
+
+### `dnsmasq.d/99-ipxe-chainload.conf`
+
+Enables architecture-aware PXE boot via DHCP:
+
+| Client | Vendor class | Boot file served |
+|---|---|---|
+| EFI iPXE already running | arch 7 + option 175 | `http://.../boot.ipxe` |
+| BIOS iPXE already running | arch 0 + option 175 | `http://.../boot.ipxe` |
+| EFI, no iPXE yet | `PXEClient:Arch:00007` | `ipxe.efi` via TFTP |
+| BIOS/legacy, no iPXE yet | `PXEClient:Arch:00000` | `undionly.kpxe` via TFTP |
+
+Proxmox EFI VMs also require a **VirtIO RNG device** (gives OVMF
+enough entropy to complete PXE negotiation) and **Secure Boot disabled**
+(`pre-enrolled-keys=0` on the EFI disk, or disabled in UEFI setup).
+
+## Secrets
+
+`pihole.toml` is stored with `pwhash`, `totp_secret`, and `app_pwhash`
+redacted to empty strings. `pull-config.sh` does this automatically.
+To redact manually: `./sanitize-config.sh config/pihole.toml`.

pihole/apply-config.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Apply a Pi-hole configuration directory to a destination Pi-hole instance.
+#
+# Usage: apply-config.sh <source-dir> <dest-host>
+#   source-dir   Local directory containing config files (as written by pull-config.sh)
+#   dest-host    SSH-reachable hostname or IP of the destination Pi-hole
+#
+# Example:
+#   ./apply-config.sh ./config root@pihole-new
+#   ./apply-config.sh /backup/pihole-20260723 root@192.168.2.101
+#
+# The destination Pi-hole must already have Pi-hole v6 installed.
+# pihole-FTL is restarted at the end to apply the new config.
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+usage() {
+  echo "Usage: $(basename "$0") <source-dir> <dest-host>" >&2
+  echo "  source-dir   Local directory with config files (from pull-config.sh)" >&2
+  echo "  dest-host    SSH target for the destination Pi-hole (e.g. root@pihole)" >&2
+  exit 1
+}
+
+[[ $# -eq 2 ]] || usage
+
+SOURCE="$1"
+DEST="$2"
+
+[[ -d "${SOURCE}" ]] || { echo "Error: source directory '${SOURCE}' not found" >&2; exit 1; }
+[[ -f "${SOURCE}/pihole.toml" ]] || { echo "Error: '${SOURCE}/pihole.toml' not found — is this a valid config dir?" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+echo "Applying Pi-hole config from ${SOURCE} → ${DEST}"
+
+# ── Verify destination is running Pi-hole ──────────────────────────────────────
+ssh "${DEST}" "command -v pihole-FTL >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo 'pihole-FTL not found on destination'; exit 1; }"
+
+# ── pihole.toml ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+echo "  pihole.toml"
+ssh "${DEST}" "cp /etc/pihole/pihole.toml /etc/pihole/pihole.toml.pre-apply 2>/dev/null || true"
+scp "${SOURCE}/pihole.toml" "${DEST}:/etc/pihole/pihole.toml"
+ssh "${DEST}" "chown pihole:pihole /etc/pihole/pihole.toml; chmod 640 /etc/pihole/pihole.toml"
+
+# ── custom dnsmasq drop-ins ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+if [[ -d "${SOURCE}/dnsmasq.d" ]] && [[ -n "$(ls "${SOURCE}/dnsmasq.d/"*.conf 2>/dev/null)" ]]; then
+  echo "  dnsmasq.d/ (custom drop-ins)"
+  for f in "${SOURCE}/dnsmasq.d/"*.conf; do
+    name="$(basename "$f")"
+    echo "    ${name}"
+    scp "${f}" "${DEST}:/etc/dnsmasq.d/${name}"
+  done
+fi
+
+# ── Restart pihole-FTL ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+echo "  Restarting pihole-FTL"
+ssh "${DEST}" "systemctl restart pihole-FTL"
+sleep 2
+ssh "${DEST}" "systemctl is-active pihole-FTL"
+
+echo "Done. Config applied to ${DEST}."
+echo "Note: gravity (blocklists) is not transferred — run 'pihole updateGravity' on ${DEST} to rebuild."

pihole/config/dnsmasq.d/99-ipxe-chainload.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# Detect iPXE clients (already running iPXE).
+dhcp-match=set:ipxe,175
+dhcp-userclass=set:ipxe,iPXE
+
+# Detect UEFI x86_64 clients by client architecture.
+dhcp-match=set:efi64,option:client-arch,7
+dhcp-match=set:efi64,option:client-arch,9
+
+# Boot file selection — more positive tags = higher priority.
+# EFI iPXE (2 tags): already running iPXE on EFI, chain to HTTP menu.
+dhcp-boot=tag:ipxe,tag:efi64,http://192.168.2.247/boot.ipxe
+
+# BIOS iPXE (1 tag): already running iPXE, chain to HTTP menu.
+dhcp-boot=tag:ipxe,http://192.168.2.247/boot.ipxe
+
+# EFI non-iPXE (1 tag): send the EFI iPXE binary.
+dhcp-boot=tag:efi64,ipxe.efi,,192.168.2.247
+
+# BIOS/legacy fallback (0 tags): send the BIOS iPXE binary.
+dhcp-boot=undionly.kpxe,,192.168.2.247

pihole/pull-config.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Pull Pi-hole configuration from a running instance to a local directory.
+# Sensitive fields (password hashes, TOTP secrets) are redacted automatically.
+#
+# Usage: pull-config.sh <source-host> <dest-dir>
+#   source-host  SSH-reachable hostname or IP of the source Pi-hole
+#   dest-dir     Local directory to write config into (created if absent)
+#
+# Example:
+#   ./pull-config.sh root@pihole ./config
+#   ./pull-config.sh root@192.168.2.253 /backup/pihole-$(date +%Y%m%d)
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
+
+usage() {
+  echo "Usage: $(basename "$0") <source-host> <dest-dir>" >&2
+  echo "  source-host  SSH target for the source Pi-hole (e.g. root@pihole)" >&2
+  echo "  dest-dir     Local directory to write config files into" >&2
+  exit 1
+}
+
+[[ $# -eq 2 ]] || usage
+
+SOURCE="$1"
+DEST="$2"
+
+echo "Pulling Pi-hole config from ${SOURCE} → ${DEST}"
+
+mkdir -p "${DEST}/dnsmasq.d"
+
+# ── pihole.toml ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+echo "  pihole.toml"
+ssh "${SOURCE}" "cat /etc/pihole/pihole.toml" > "${DEST}/pihole.toml"
+"${SCRIPT_DIR}/sanitize-config.sh" "${DEST}/pihole.toml"
+
+# ── custom dnsmasq drop-ins ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Pi-hole manages its own generated config; we only capture user-added files.
+echo "  dnsmasq.d/ (custom drop-ins)"
+ssh "${SOURCE}" "ls /etc/dnsmasq.d/*.conf 2>/dev/null || true" | while read -r f; do
+  name="$(basename "$f")"
+  echo "    ${name}"
+  ssh "${SOURCE}" "cat '${f}'" > "${DEST}/dnsmasq.d/${name}"
+done
+
+# ── DHCP static leases ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+echo "  dhcp.leases"
+ssh "${SOURCE}" "cat /etc/pihole/dhcp.leases 2>/dev/null || true" > "${DEST}/dhcp.leases"
+
+echo "Done. Config written to ${DEST}/"

pihole/sanitize-config.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Redact sensitive fields from a Pi-hole pihole.toml before committing.
+# Called automatically by pull-config.sh; can also be run manually.
+#
+# Usage: sanitize-config.sh <pihole.toml>
+#   Edits the file in-place, replacing sensitive field values with "".
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+usage() {
+  echo "Usage: $(basename "$0") <pihole.toml>" >&2
+  exit 1
+}
+
+[[ $# -eq 1 ]] || usage
+FILE="$1"
+[[ -f "$FILE" ]] || { echo "Error: file not found: $FILE" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+REDACTED=0
+
+redact_field() {
+  local field="$1"
+  # Match lines like:  pwhash = "some-value"  and blank the value
+  if grep -qE "^\s+${field}\s*=\s*\"[^\"]{1,}\"" "$FILE"; then
+    sed -i -E "s|^(\s+${field}\s*=\s*)\"[^\"]*\"|\1\"\"|" "$FILE"
+    echo "  redacted: ${field}"
+    REDACTED=$((REDACTED + 1))
+  fi
+}
+
+echo "Sanitizing $(basename "$FILE")..."
+redact_field "pwhash"
+redact_field "app_pwhash"
+redact_field "totp_secret"
+
+if [[ $REDACTED -eq 0 ]]; then
+  echo "  (nothing to redact)"
+else
+  echo "  ${REDACTED} field(s) redacted."
+fi

proxmox/CLAUDE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+# CLAUDE.md
+
+Guidance for Claude Code working in this repo. IMPORTANT: these
+instructions OVERRIDE any default behavior and must be followed exactly
+as written.
+
+## Repo purpose
+
+Base configuration/hardening toolset and planning docs for Proxmox VE
+hosts (`scripts/`, `config/`, `docs/`) — see `README.md` and
+`docs/00-overview.md`. Scripts in this repo are meant to be run **on**
+the target Proxmox host itself (as root), not orchestrated remotely.
+
+## Two Proxmox nodes: `pve1` (production) and `pve-test` (sandbox)
+
+Two SSH-reachable Proxmox nodes exist on the LAN. They are **not
+interchangeable** — see `docs/05-node-roles.md` for full background on
+what each one is and why.
+
+### `pve1` (production — off-limits to Claude by default)
+
+A real, live Proxmox node hosting production VMs/containers (see
+`docs/05-node-roles.md` for the current guest list) — not a sandbox, and
+not Claude's to touch by default.
+
+- **Off-limits at all times unless the operator has given explicit,
+  same-session instructions to act on this specific host.** That
+  authorization is scoped to the task it was given for — don't carry it
+  forward to unrelated later work in the same conversation, and never
+  assume it from a previous session.
+- **Read-only for existing state is always fine, authorization or not.**
+  SSH in (or use `pvesm`, `qm list`, `pct list`, `qm config`, `pct
+  config`, the Proxmox API, etc.) to inspect config, storage, and any
+  existing VM/container freely.
+- **Never** modify, stop, restart, delete, reconfigure, or create
+  anything on this node (`qm set`, `pct set`, `qm destroy`, `pct
+  destroy`, `qm stop`, `pct stop`, `qm create`, `pct create`, snapshot
+  operations, storage changes, running any script in this repo against
+  it, etc.) without that explicit go-ahead. Use `pve-test` for anything
+  exploratory instead.
+- If a guest on `pve1` is HA-managed, be aware of the self-fence hazard
+  described in `docs/05-node-roles.md`'s cluster-teardown section before
+  doing anything that could cost the node quorum.
+
+### `pve-test` (sandbox — Claude's default target)
+
+A separate node set aside for testing — safe to create, interrogate, and
+destroy scratch VMs/containers on without asking first.
+
+- **Test VMs/containers are allowed, but must be torn down.** Anything
+  created this way must be destroyed again in the same session, before
+  ending the task. Use an obviously-scratch VMID/name.
+- **Node-level config is still not yours to change by default.**
+  Creating/destroying your own scratch guests is fine; Proxmox host
+  config, storage pools, and networking on `pve-test` itself need the
+  operator's explicit go-ahead too, same as on `pve1` — the "sandbox"
+  status covers guest-level experimentation, not the host's own
+  identity. (`pve-test`'s current network config, `docs/06-pve-test-wifi-network.md`,
+  was applied under exactly that kind of explicit, same-session
+  authorization — it's not a standing invitation to keep changing it
+  further without asking again.)
+- **Never re-cluster `pve-test` with `pve1`** without the operator
+  explicitly asking for it and being aware of the wifi/corosync
+  incompatibility in `docs/06-pve-test-wifi-network.md` — the two were
+  deliberately de-clustered for this reason once already.
+
+## Safety rules
+
+- Any script in `scripts/` that isn't `audit.sh` (read-only) makes real
+  changes when run for real. Don't run one against `pve1`, or against
+  `pve-test`'s node-level config, without the same-session go-ahead
+  described above. Running a script *against pve-test's own guests* — a
+  scratch VM/CT you created for this task — doesn't need separate
+  permission.
+- Do not commit secrets: SSH private keys, wifi passphrases, sops/age
+  keys, or PVE credentials. `scripts/setup-wifi-bond-network.sh` takes
+  the SSID/passphrase via environment variables for exactly this reason
+  — never hardcode them into the script or a committed config file.
+- Live changes to a node's own management network (the interface/bridge
+  carrying the SSH session you're using) can strand the box — see the
+  "what went wrong once" section in `docs/06-pve-test-wifi-network.md`
+  before touching `pve-test`'s networking again. Prefer applying via
+  `ifreload -a` over raw `ip link` surgery, and arm an auto-revert
+  watchdog first when acting without someone physically at the console.

proxmox/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+> Part of the [debian-configuration](../README.md) repo — see the root README for repo-wide layout and secret-scanning setup.
+
+# Proxmox Configuration
+
+Base configuration and hardening toolset for Proxmox VE hosts, plus planning
+docs for eventually growing this into a 3-node HA/Ceph cluster. See
+`docs/00-overview.md` for the staging: **Stage 1** (base config/hardening,
+applies to any host — active) vs. **Stage 2** (multi-node HA/Ceph — future,
+deferred).
+
+## Goals
+
+- Stage 1: a reusable, idempotent base-hardening toolset (`scripts/`) that
+  can be run against any new Proxmox host — repo/updates, SSH, firewall, PVE
+  user/access hardening — verified with `scripts/audit.sh`.
+- Stage 2 (future): 3-node cluster, quorum via corosync, HA-managed VMs
+  backed by Ceph. Needs dedicated hardware node 1 (`pve1`, an ASUS PN53 mini
+  PC) doesn't have — see `docs/01-hardware-node1.md`.
+
+See `CLAUDE.md` for the guardrails Claude Code follows when working
+against these hosts (`pve1` is production and off-limits by default;
+`pve-test` is the sandbox).
+
+## Repo layout
+
+- `docs/` — planning docs: hardware layout, storage migration, networking,
+  security hardening, node roles. Read `docs/00-overview.md` first, then
+  `docs/05-node-roles.md` for what `pve1`/`pve-test` actually are.
+- `scripts/` — scripts to apply configuration on a node (SSH hardening, repo
+  switch, firewall, updates, wifi/bond networking, etc). Idempotent, safe
+  to re-run. `scripts/bootstrap.sh` runs the full Stage 1 sequence end to
+  end; `scripts/audit.sh` verifies it (read-only).
+  `scripts/setup-wifi-bond-network.sh` reproduces `pve-test`'s wifi
+  network (see `docs/06-pve-test-wifi-network.md`). `scripts/lib/` holds
+  shared helpers (`common.sh`) sourced by the other scripts.
+- `config/` — reference config files/snippets to drop onto a node (firewall
+  rules, sshd config, etc.).
+
+## Quick start (Stage 1, on a fresh node)
+
+```
+MGMT_CIDR=192.168.2.0/24 ./scripts/bootstrap.sh
+./scripts/create-admin-user.sh <username>
+# then enable 2FA for that user + root@pam via the web UI
+./scripts/audit.sh
+```
+
+## Status
+
+`pve1` built (ASUS PN53 mini PC, ZFS mirror boot+VM storage, single
+2.5GbE NIC) and already running production VMs/CTs. Stage 1 base
+hardening applied and verified (`scripts/audit.sh` all green): enterprise
+repos removed, SSH key-only + fail2ban, unattended security upgrades,
+PVE firewall (mgmt-only), subscription nag disabled, named admin user
+(`wayne@pve`) created. Remaining manual step: enable 2FA/TOTP for
+`wayne@pve` and `root@pam` via the web UI. Stage 2 (cluster/Ceph) not
+started — needs nodes 2/3 on hardware that can actually support it.

proxmox/docs/04-security-hardening.md

@@ -16,24 +16,31 @@ Then run `scripts/audit.sh` to verify. Order matters (matches
 | # | Item | Script | Manual step required? |
 |---|------|--------|------------------------|
 | 1 | Remove enterprise repos, switch to no-subscription | `switch-to-no-subscription-repo.sh` | no |
-| 2 | SSH: key-only root login + fail2ban | `harden-ssh.sh` | no (requires an `authorized_keys` already in place — script warns if missing) |
+| 2 | Linux admin user with SSH key + sudo access | `setup-linux-admin-user.sh <user> <pubkey>` | yes — choose a username and provide your SSH public key. Run this **before** SSH hardening or pass `ADMIN_USER`/`ADMIN_SSH_KEY` to `bootstrap.sh` so it runs automatically at the right point |
-| 3 | Unattended security upgrades, no auto-reboot | `setup-unattended-upgrades.sh` | no |
+| 3 | Passwordless sudo for pvesh/qm/pct | `setup-admin-sudo.sh <username>` | yes — same username as step 2 |
-| 4 | PVE firewall, default-deny, mgmt-only SSH/8006 | `deploy-firewall.sh` | needs `MGMT_CIDR` set |
+| 4 | SSH: key-only root login + fail2ban | `harden-ssh.sh` | no — step 2 ensures authorized_keys are in place first |
-| 5 | Disable subscription nag (cosmetic) | `disable-subscription-nag.sh` | no |
+| 5 | Unattended security upgrades, no auto-reboot | `setup-unattended-upgrades.sh` | no |
-| 6 | Named PVE admin user, Administrator role | `create-admin-user.sh <username>` | yes — pick the username, change the generated password on first login |
+| 6 | PVE firewall, default-deny, mgmt-only SSH/8006 | `deploy-firewall.sh` | needs `MGMT_CIDR` set |
-| 7 | 2FA/TOTP on that user and `root@pam` | — | yes — web UI only: Datacenter → Permissions → Two Factor, or user menu → TFA |
+| 7 | Disable subscription nag (cosmetic) | `disable-subscription-nag.sh` | no |
-| 8 | Verify everything above | `audit.sh` | no |
+| 8 | Named PVE admin user, Administrator role | `create-admin-user.sh <username>` | yes — pick the username, change the generated password on first login |
+| 9 | 2FA/TOTP on that user and `root@pam` | — | yes — web UI only: Datacenter → Permissions → Two Factor, or user menu → TFA |
+| 10 | Verify everything above | `audit.sh` | no |
 
 ## Linux/SSH layer
 
+- A named Linux system user (created by `setup-linux-admin-user.sh`) with an
+  SSH authorized key and `sudo` group membership is the primary SSH login
+  account. Root SSH is locked to key-only after `harden-ssh.sh` runs; the
+  Linux admin user is how you get shell access day-to-day without using root.
+- `setup-admin-sudo.sh` adds a narrower, password-free sudoers rule for the
+  Proxmox management tools (`pvesh`, `qm`, `pct`) specifically — needed for
+  non-interactive automation scripts that SSH in and run these tools without a
+  TTY.
 - `PermitRootLogin prohibit-password` in `sshd_config` — root can only
   log in via SSH key, never password. Kills most brute-force attempts.
 - fail2ban jail for SSH on top of that.
 - Restrict SSH to the management VLAN/trusted IPs via the Proxmox
   firewall (see `03-networking.md`) rather than exposing broadly.
-- A separate Linux sudo user isn't strictly required for day-to-day PVE
-  admin (the PVE permission system below governs that), but worth adding
-  if multiple people SSH into the box directly, for accountability.
 
 ## PVE/web layer (the one that actually matters day-to-day)
 

proxmox/docs/06-pve-test-wifi-network.md

@@ -181,45 +181,6 @@ a real outage**: SSH (`ssh root@pve-test.sweet.home`) → web UI via `curl
 only then worry about `ping` specifically, and check
 `/etc/pve/firewall/cluster.fw` before blaming the network.
 
-## Confirmed limitation: no wireless client on the same AP can reach pve-test
-
-**This is not an AP-isolation toggle** — tested and ruled out (router:
-TP-Link BE9300, AP Isolation confirmed unchecked). Two independent
-wireless devices (a laptop and a phone) on the same SSID pve-test uses
-(`nbn-fttp-net-5G`) were both completely unable to reach it — not
-intermittent, not slow, no ARP entry ever resolves (`arp -a` on Windows /
-`ip neigh` on Linux/Mac shows nothing at all, not a stale entry). Every
-wired device tested (this repo's own Claude session, `pve1`) reaches it
-fine, every time.
-
-Root cause: pve-test's wifi connection uses 4-address (WDS) framing to
-make bridging possible at all (see above) — that's what lets the AP
-forward frames from arbitrary MACs (VM traffic, the bridge's own
-identity) instead of only the wifi card's own hardware MAC. This
-router's firmware evidently handles wired↔pve-test forwarding for that
-4addr peer correctly, but doesn't correctly forward *wireless-client*
-broadcast/ARP traffic to it — an asymmetric gap in the AP's own 4addr
-handling, not a policy setting. Likely not fixable short of a firmware
-update from TP-Link (if one ever improves 4addr/WDS handling), possibly
-not fixable on this hardware at all.
-
-**Practical implication**: anything on `vmbr0` — pve-test itself, or any
-VM/CT created on it — is unreachable from a wireless client on this AP,
-full stop, for *any* protocol, not just ICMP. ARP resolution is a
-prerequisite for sending any IP packet at all (TCP included); since ARP
-itself never resolves for a wireless peer here, the web UI (8006) fails
-identically to ping, not just ping — confirmed live, not theoretical.
-This includes VMs on pve-test too, since they ride the same bridge/wifi
-uplink as the host. **Wired access is the only reliable path to
-pve-test and anything running on it** — including reaching a VM's
-console through the Proxmox web UI, which still requires the accessing
-device to reach pve-test's own IP on port 8006 first, so it inherits the
-same requirement.
-
-Don't waste time on ARP flushes, firewall rules, or bonding config for
-this specific symptom (no ARP entry from a wireless peer, wired fine) —
-none of those are the cause.
-
 ## Known limitation history
 
 `nic0` (the bond's backup slave) initially had no cable physically

proxmox/scripts/audit.sh

@@ -58,11 +58,6 @@ if [ -f /etc/pve/firewall/cluster.fw ] && grep -qi '^policy_in:\s*DROP' /etc/pve
 else
     audit_fail "cluster.fw missing or does not default-deny inbound"
 fi
-if [ -f /etc/pve/firewall/cluster.fw ] && grep -qi 'icmp-type echo-request' /etc/pve/firewall/cluster.fw 2>/dev/null; then
-    audit_pass "cluster.fw allows ICMP echo-request from mgmt (ping works)"
-else
-    audit_fail "cluster.fw does not allow ping from mgmt - see docs/04-security-hardening.md firewall section"
-fi
 
 # --- unattended-upgrades ---
 if dpkg -s unattended-upgrades >/dev/null 2>&1 && systemctl is-enabled --quiet unattended-upgrades 2>/dev/null; then
@@ -74,6 +69,22 @@ if [ -f /var/run/reboot-required ]; then
     audit_warn "a reboot is pending (/var/run/reboot-required) - schedule one"
 fi
 
+# --- Linux admin user with SSH key (for non-root SSH login) ---
+LINUX_ADMIN_OK=0
+for auth_file in /home/*/.ssh/authorized_keys; do
+    [ -f "$auth_file" ] || continue
+    # Must have at least one non-comment, non-empty key line.
+    if grep -qE '^(ssh-rsa|ssh-ed25519|ecdsa-sha2-nistp[0-9]+) ' "$auth_file" 2>/dev/null; then
+        LINUX_ADMIN_OK=1
+        break
+    fi
+done
+if [ "$LINUX_ADMIN_OK" -eq 1 ]; then
+    audit_pass "a non-root Linux user has an SSH authorized key"
+else
+    audit_fail "no non-root Linux user has an authorized SSH key (run setup-linux-admin-user.sh)"
+fi
+
 # --- named admin user (not just root@pam) ---
 if pveum user list --output-format json 2>/dev/null | grep -q '"userid":"[^"]*@pve"'; then
     audit_pass "a named @pve admin user exists (root@pam is not the only account)"
@@ -81,6 +92,23 @@ else
     audit_fail "no named @pve user found - root@pam is the only account"
 fi
 
+# --- passwordless sudo for pvesh/qm/pct ---
+# The nixos flake's create-proxmox-resource.sh runs pvesh/qm/pct over
+# non-interactive SSH, so the admin user needs NOPASSWD for these tools.
+SUDO_OK=0
+for f in /etc/sudoers.d/*-proxmox; do
+    [ -f "$f" ] || continue
+    if grep -qE 'NOPASSWD:.*pvesh' "$f" && grep -qE 'NOPASSWD:.*\bqm\b' "$f" && grep -qE 'NOPASSWD:.*\bpct\b' "$f"; then
+        SUDO_OK=1
+        break
+    fi
+done
+if [ "$SUDO_OK" -eq 1 ]; then
+    audit_pass "admin user has NOPASSWD sudo for pvesh/qm/pct"
+else
+    audit_fail "no sudoers file grants NOPASSWD for pvesh/qm/pct (run setup-admin-sudo.sh <username>)"
+fi
+
 # --- time sync ---
 if timedatectl show -p NTPSynchronized --value 2>/dev/null | grep -qx 'yes'; then
     audit_pass "clock is NTP-synchronized"

proxmox/scripts/bootstrap.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# Stage 1 base config + hardening, end to end, for a single fresh PVE host.
+# Runs the individual scripts in order. Idempotent - safe to re-run.
+#
+# If ADMIN_USER and ADMIN_SSH_KEY are set, a Linux system user is created
+# with SSH key access and sudo before SSH hardening runs - so key-based
+# login is in place before password auth is disabled. If they are not set,
+# a reminder is printed at the end to run setup-linux-admin-user.sh manually
+# (but do this BEFORE disconnecting, since password auth will be disabled).
+#
+# Usage:
+#   MGMT_CIDR=192.168.2.0/24 ./bootstrap.sh
+#   MGMT_CIDR=192.168.2.0/24 ADMIN_USER=wayne ADMIN_SSH_KEY="ssh-ed25519 ..." ./bootstrap.sh
+set -euo pipefail
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+# shellcheck source=lib/common.sh
+source "${SCRIPT_DIR}/lib/common.sh"
+require_root
+
+if [ -z "${MGMT_CIDR:-}" ]; then
+    echo "MGMT_CIDR is not set. Example: MGMT_CIDR=192.168.2.0/24 $0" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+STEP=0
+next_step() { STEP=$((STEP + 1)); echo; echo "=== ${STEP}: $* ==="; }
+
+next_step "remove enterprise repos, switch to no-subscription"
+"${SCRIPT_DIR}/switch-to-no-subscription-repo.sh"
+
+# Create the Linux admin user before SSH hardening so that authorized_keys
+# is in place before password auth is disabled.
+if [ -n "${ADMIN_USER:-}" ] && [ -n "${ADMIN_SSH_KEY:-}" ]; then
+    next_step "Linux admin user '${ADMIN_USER}' + SSH key + sudo group"
+    "${SCRIPT_DIR}/setup-linux-admin-user.sh" "$ADMIN_USER" "$ADMIN_SSH_KEY"
+
+    next_step "passwordless sudo for pvesh/qm/pct (${ADMIN_USER})"
+    "${SCRIPT_DIR}/setup-admin-sudo.sh" "$ADMIN_USER"
+else
+    echo
+    echo "WARNING: ADMIN_USER / ADMIN_SSH_KEY not set -- skipping Linux user setup."
+    echo "  Run setup-linux-admin-user.sh and setup-admin-sudo.sh BEFORE disconnecting"
+    echo "  from this session, since the next step disables password authentication."
+fi
+
+next_step "SSH hardening (key-only root login + fail2ban)"
+"${SCRIPT_DIR}/harden-ssh.sh"
+
+next_step "unattended security upgrades"
+"${SCRIPT_DIR}/setup-unattended-upgrades.sh"
+
+next_step "PVE firewall (mgmt-only SSH/8006)"
+MGMT_CIDR="$MGMT_CIDR" "${SCRIPT_DIR}/deploy-firewall.sh"
+
+next_step "disable subscription nag (cosmetic)"
+"${SCRIPT_DIR}/disable-subscription-nag.sh"
+
+echo
+echo "=== Base hardening applied. Remaining manual/deliberate steps: ==="
+if [ -z "${ADMIN_USER:-}" ]; then
+    echo "  - ${SCRIPT_DIR}/setup-linux-admin-user.sh <username> <ssh-pubkey>"
+    echo "  - ${SCRIPT_DIR}/setup-admin-sudo.sh <username>   (NOPASSWD for pvesh/qm/pct)"
+fi
+echo "  - ${SCRIPT_DIR}/create-admin-user.sh <username>   (PVE web UI account)"
+echo "  - Enable 2FA/TOTP for that user and root@pam via the web UI"
+echo "  - ${SCRIPT_DIR}/audit.sh   (verify everything above)"

proxmox/scripts/setup-admin-sudo.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# Grant a named admin user passwordless sudo for Proxmox management tools
+# (pvesh, qm, pct) and the Nix package manager so that scripts in the
+# nixos flake repo can run these over non-interactive SSH without a TTY.
+#
+# Nix is included because single-user Nix installations (common on PVE
+# hosts bootstrapped via codex-setup.sh) are owned by root; non-root
+# users can't touch the Nix store lock without sudo.
+#
+# Idempotent - safe to re-run (rewrites if paths have changed). Run as
+# root on the PVE host.
+#
+# Usage: ./setup-admin-sudo.sh <username>
+set -euo pipefail
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+# shellcheck source=lib/common.sh
+source "${SCRIPT_DIR}/lib/common.sh"
+require_root
+
+USERNAME="${1:-}"
+if [ -z "$USERNAME" ]; then
+    echo "Usage: $0 <username>" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+# Resolve actual binary paths at script time -- they differ across Proxmox
+# versions (pvesh moved from /usr/sbin to /usr/bin in PVE 8.x) and the
+# sudoers rule must match the real path or sudo will fall back to
+# prompting for a password.
+resolve_bin() {
+    command -v "$1" 2>/dev/null || { echo "ERROR: $1 not found on PATH" >&2; exit 1; }
+}
+
+PVESH="$(resolve_bin pvesh)"
+QM="$(resolve_bin qm)"
+PCT="$(resolve_bin pct)"
+# Nix installs to a fixed path regardless of which user bootstrapped it.
+NIX_BIN="/nix/var/nix/profiles/default/bin/nix"
+if [ ! -x "$NIX_BIN" ]; then
+    echo "WARNING: $NIX_BIN not found -- Nix may not be installed yet." >&2
+    echo "         Re-run this script after running codex-setup.sh on the node." >&2
+    NIX_BIN=""
+fi
+
+SUDOERS_FILE="/etc/sudoers.d/${USERNAME}-proxmox"
+NIX_ENTRY="${NIX_BIN:+, ${NIX_BIN}}"
+CONTENT="${USERNAME} ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: ${PVESH}, ${QM}, ${PCT}${NIX_ENTRY}"
+
+write_if_changed "$SUDOERS_FILE" "$CONTENT"
+
+# visudo -c validates the file we just wrote before we walk away.
+if visudo -c -f "$SUDOERS_FILE" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    chmod 0440 "$SUDOERS_FILE"
+    echo "Sudoers rule for ${USERNAME} is valid and in place."
+    echo "  ${CONTENT}"
+else
+    echo "ERROR: sudoers validation failed -- removing bad file." >&2
+    rm -f "$SUDOERS_FILE"
+    exit 1
+fi

proxmox/scripts/setup-linux-admin-user.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# Create a Linux system user for SSH access and sudo, and install their
+# authorized SSH public key. Run this before harden-ssh.sh so that
+# key-based access is in place before password authentication is disabled.
+#
+# Idempotent - safe to re-run. Run as root on the PVE host.
+#
+# Usage:
+#   ./setup-linux-admin-user.sh <username> <ssh-public-key>
+#   ./setup-linux-admin-user.sh <username> --key-file <path-to-.pub>
+set -euo pipefail
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+# shellcheck source=lib/common.sh
+source "${SCRIPT_DIR}/lib/common.sh"
+require_root
+
+USERNAME="${1:-}"
+if [ -z "$USERNAME" ]; then
+    echo "Usage: $0 <username> <ssh-public-key>" >&2
+    echo "       $0 <username> --key-file <path-to-.pub>" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+shift
+SSH_KEY=""
+if [ "${1:-}" = "--key-file" ]; then
+    KEY_FILE="${2:-}"
+    [ -z "$KEY_FILE" ] && { echo "ERROR: --key-file requires a path." >&2; exit 1; }
+    [ -f "$KEY_FILE" ] || { echo "ERROR: key file not found: $KEY_FILE" >&2; exit 1; }
+    SSH_KEY="$(cat "$KEY_FILE")"
+else
+    SSH_KEY="${1:-}"
+fi
+
+if [ -z "$SSH_KEY" ]; then
+    echo "ERROR: an SSH public key is required (key string or --key-file <path>)." >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+if ! echo "$SSH_KEY" | grep -qE '^(ssh-rsa|ssh-ed25519|ecdsa-sha2-nistp[0-9]+) [A-Za-z0-9+/=]'; then
+    echo "ERROR: argument doesn't look like a valid SSH public key." >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+# --- create Linux user if missing ---
+if id "$USERNAME" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    echo "User '${USERNAME}' already exists - skipping useradd."
+else
+    useradd --create-home --shell /bin/bash "$USERNAME"
+    echo "Created Linux user '${USERNAME}'."
+fi
+
+# --- sudo group membership ---
+if id -nG "$USERNAME" | grep -qw sudo; then
+    echo "User '${USERNAME}' is already in the sudo group."
+else
+    usermod --append --groups sudo "$USERNAME"
+    echo "Added '${USERNAME}' to the sudo group."
+fi
+
+# --- install authorized SSH key ---
+HOME_DIR="$(getent passwd "$USERNAME" | cut -d: -f6)"
+SSH_DIR="${HOME_DIR}/.ssh"
+AUTH_FILE="${SSH_DIR}/authorized_keys"
+
+mkdir -p "$SSH_DIR"
+chmod 700 "$SSH_DIR"
+touch "$AUTH_FILE"
+chmod 600 "$AUTH_FILE"
+chown -R "${USERNAME}:${USERNAME}" "$SSH_DIR"
+
+if grep -qF "$SSH_KEY" "$AUTH_FILE" 2>/dev/null; then
+    echo "SSH key is already present in ${AUTH_FILE}."
+else
+    echo "$SSH_KEY" >> "$AUTH_FILE"
+    echo "Installed SSH key in ${AUTH_FILE}."
+fi
+
+echo
+echo "Linux user '${USERNAME}' is ready for SSH key-based login with sudo access."
+echo "Next: run setup-admin-sudo.sh ${USERNAME} to grant NOPASSWD for pvesh/qm/pct."

scripts/bootstrap.sh

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-# Stage 1 base config + hardening, end to end, for a single fresh PVE host.
-# Runs the individual scripts in order. Idempotent - safe to re-run.
-#
-# Does NOT create the named admin user (needs a username decision) - run
-# create-admin-user.sh separately afterwards. Run audit.sh at the end to
-# verify.
-#
-# Usage: MGMT_CIDR=192.168.2.0/24 ./bootstrap.sh
-set -euo pipefail
-
-SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
-# shellcheck source=lib/common.sh
-source "${SCRIPT_DIR}/lib/common.sh"
-require_root
-
-if [ -z "${MGMT_CIDR:-}" ]; then
-    echo "MGMT_CIDR is not set. Example: MGMT_CIDR=192.168.2.0/24 $0" >&2
-    exit 1
-fi
-
-echo "=== 1/5: remove enterprise repos, switch to no-subscription ==="
-"${SCRIPT_DIR}/switch-to-no-subscription-repo.sh"
-
-echo
-echo "=== 2/5: SSH hardening (key-only root login + fail2ban) ==="
-"${SCRIPT_DIR}/harden-ssh.sh"
-
-echo
-echo "=== 3/5: unattended security upgrades ==="
-"${SCRIPT_DIR}/setup-unattended-upgrades.sh"
-
-echo
-echo "=== 4/5: PVE firewall (mgmt-only SSH/8006) ==="
-MGMT_CIDR="$MGMT_CIDR" "${SCRIPT_DIR}/deploy-firewall.sh"
-
-echo
-echo "=== 5/5: disable subscription nag (cosmetic) ==="
-"${SCRIPT_DIR}/disable-subscription-nag.sh"
-
-echo
-echo "=== Base hardening applied. Remaining manual/deliberate steps: ==="
-echo "  - ${SCRIPT_DIR}/create-admin-user.sh <username>"
-echo "  - Enable 2FA/TOTP for that user and root@pam via the web UI"
-echo "  - ${SCRIPT_DIR}/audit.sh   (verify everything above)"

scripts/check-secrets.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Scan the repo for secrets and sensitive config values.
+# Runs via CI (GitHub/Gitea Actions) and locally as a pre-commit check.
+#
+# Usage: scripts/check-secrets.sh [--staged-only]
+#   --staged-only  Only check files staged for commit (for pre-commit hook use)
+#
+# Requires gitleaks on PATH, or falls back to Docker if available.
+# Install gitleaks: https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks#installing
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+REPO_ROOT="$(git -C "$(dirname "$0")" rev-parse --show-toplevel)"
+STAGED_ONLY=false
+FAILURES=0
+
+for arg in "$@"; do
+  [[ "$arg" == "--staged-only" ]] && STAGED_ONLY=true
+done
+
+cd "$REPO_ROOT"
+
+# ── Resolve gitleaks binary ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+if command -v gitleaks &>/dev/null; then
+  GITLEAKS="gitleaks"
+elif command -v docker &>/dev/null; then
+  GITLEAKS="docker run --rm -v ${REPO_ROOT}:/repo zricethezav/gitleaks:latest"
+  # Adjust paths for docker context
+  REPO_ROOT="/repo"
+else
+  echo "ERROR: gitleaks not found. Install it or ensure Docker is available." >&2
+  echo "  https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks#installing" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+echo "=== Secret scan ==="
+
+if [[ "$STAGED_ONLY" == "true" ]]; then
+  # Pre-commit mode: scan only staged content
+  echo "Mode: staged files only"
+  if ! $GITLEAKS protect --staged --config="${REPO_ROOT}/.gitleaks.toml" --source="${REPO_ROOT}" 2>&1; then
+    FAILURES=$((FAILURES + 1))
+  fi
+else
+  # CI mode: scan full git history
+  echo "Mode: full git history"
+  if ! $GITLEAKS detect --config="${REPO_ROOT}/.gitleaks.toml" --source="${REPO_ROOT}" 2>&1; then
+    FAILURES=$((FAILURES + 1))
+  fi
+fi
+
+# ── Pi-hole specific checks ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+echo ""
+echo "=== Pi-hole config checks ==="
+
+PIHOLE_TOML="${REPO_ROOT}/pihole/config/pihole.toml"
+
+if [[ -f "$PIHOLE_TOML" ]]; then
+  # Check that known sensitive fields are empty
+  for field in pwhash totp_secret app_pwhash; do
+    value=$(grep -E "^\s+${field}\s*=" "$PIHOLE_TOML" | sed 's/.*=\s*"\(.*\)".*/\1/' | tr -d '[:space:]' || true)
+    if [[ -n "$value" && "$value" != '""' ]]; then
+      echo "FAIL: pihole.toml contains a non-empty '${field}' — run pihole/sanitize-config.sh before committing" >&2
+      FAILURES=$((FAILURES + 1))
+    else
+      echo "  OK: ${field} is empty"
+    fi
+  done
+else
+  echo "  (pihole/config/pihole.toml not present, skipping Pi-hole checks)"
+fi
+
+# ── Summary ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+echo ""
+if [[ $FAILURES -gt 0 ]]; then
+  echo "FAILED: ${FAILURES} issue(s) found. Fix before committing." >&2
+  exit 1
+else
+  echo "All checks passed."
+fi

scripts/install-hooks.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Install git hooks that run the secret scan before every commit.
+# Run once after cloning: bash scripts/install-hooks.sh
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+REPO_ROOT="$(git -C "$(dirname "$0")" rev-parse --show-toplevel)"
+HOOK="${REPO_ROOT}/.git/hooks/pre-commit"
+
+cat > "$HOOK" << 'HOOK'
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+exec "$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)/scripts/check-secrets.sh" --staged-only
+HOOK
+
+chmod +x "$HOOK"
+echo "Installed pre-commit hook → ${HOOK}"
+echo "The secret scan will run automatically before every commit."